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ABSTRACT
Youth gang problems are proliferating across the United States, even in small cities and 
towns. At the same time, the composition of youth gangs is changing; smaller, less 
structured gangs are emerging, and although drug trafficking is generally not an 
organized activity managed by gangs, drug gangs are more predominant now than in 
previous decades. The racial/ethnic composition of gangs is also changing, and gangs are 
becoming more organized. Gang violence, particularly homicide, has increased due 
mainly to the availability and use of more dangerous weapons, especially automatic and 
semiautomatic handguns. Most gang problems are "homegrown;" gang migration 
apparently contributes little to local gang problems. Although significant progress is 
being made in identifying the major risk factors for youth gang involvement, much more 
information is needed to specify the developmental sequence by which these risk factors 
operate. This knowledge will be useful in the development of prevention and intervention 
programs. A youth gang initiative that saw much success in cooperation with other 
programs n East Palo Alto resulted in it being called the murder capital of the world to a 
city now outside the top 20 in murder rates. After an extensive literature review this 
intervention program is proposed for use in Lowndes County and, more specifically, 
Valdosta State University as the center. Bringing the intervention program to a college 
campus provides an opportunity for all parties to understand the racial/ethnic composition 
of gangs and how to stop the major risk factors of youth joining gangs.
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
Politicians, police, teachers, the media, elderly, and citizens everywhere seem to 
be alarmed about youth gangs in today’s society. Next to terrorists, gangs seem to be the 
number two manifestation of evil n the eyes of society. This paper is about youth gangs, 
yet, there is hardly a consensus as to what a gang really is. As a society, we think we 
know what a gang is, because we read about it in the papers with headlines about “gang- 
related homicides” or “gang drive-bys,” we see specials on television about the Bloods 
and the Crips, we see pictures of members of gangs like the Latin Kings, West Coast 
Bloods, or Hoover Street Crips. But what does it mean, exactly, when we label these 
groups? In this paper, there is no denial of the existence of gangs, nor is there the 
assumption that gangs are merely the creation of the news media and law-enforcement 
officials.
It is known that within society there are individuals who are called and who call 
themselves gangs, and some of them engage in behavior we fear and detest. But like 
other aspects of social reality, the phenomenon of gangs cannot be understood without an 
examination of the social conditions within which it exists—something policymakers 
have chosen to largely ignore. One of the major themes of this paper is that the problem 
of gangs, like the problem of crime, is a product of the existing social order placed on 
social problems. Pertaining to youth gangs, the response has been less than a willingness
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to grasp the meaning of the obvious: poverty, frustration, segregation, isolation, and 
economic despair. In part, this paper attempts to raise a consciousness about these issues 
when enacting policies to prevent youth gang activity. Another goal of this paper is to 
look at policies set forth by other police agencies to formulate a database of information, 
an explanation for, or at least an understanding of, this cultural phenomenon that is youth 
gangs.
Problem Analysis (Goals and Objectives):
First and foremost, the goal of this thesis is to end society’s reliance on 
incarceration and promote effective solutions to juvenile gang violence and activity. 
Heavy-handed suppression efforts can increase gang cohesion and police-community 
tensions, and they have a poor track record when it comes to reducing crime and 
violence. Suppression remains an enormously popular response to gang activity despite 
concerns by gang experts that such tactics can strengthen gang cohesion and increase 
tension between law enforcement and community members. Results from the data in the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Defense Prevention OJJDP 10 year study yield no evidence 
that a flood of federal dollars and arrests have had a positive impact on target 
neighborhoods.
Georgia’s juvenile justice system has attempted to protect the public and to treat 
and rehabilitate delinquent youth. While that mission still remains at the core of the 
juvenile justice system today, the system itself has changed dramatically in the past 
century. This youth gang and delinquency prevention program in Lowndes County is a 
part of a 4-year plan that has been developed to complement the strategies and programs 
of other state and federal grant programs. After examining various youth gang and
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delinquency intervention strategy this program offers a fresh look on rehabilitation, 
suppression strategies, end educational opportunities for underprivileged youth and police 
departments nationwide. This 4-year plan addresses the gaps in sendees and other areas 
of need. Additionally, the plan takes into consideration the findings of the evaluation of a 
nationwide Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T.) study by Esbensen and 
Osgood, a 10-year survey conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (OJ JDP), and failed suppression tactics, most notably Operation Ceasefire. 
With this plan, Lowndes County has established a firm commitment to attain a balance 
between the legitimate needs of the community, the juvenile offender, and the victim.
The 4-year plan consists of creating a non-profit youth development organization 
for K-12th grade students. The program works to create effective partnerships with 
families, schools, and volunteers to achieve academic and athletic success. Through one- 
on-one tutoring, free athletic sport lessons, direct instruction, college counseling, and 
parent education, the program aims to better prepare students to have productive future! 
Valdosta State University will provide the perfect backdrop for this new initiative 
partnering with the Valdosta Police Department and Lowndes County School District.
The tutoring program will be housed on campus and Valdosta State students will provide 
approximately 90 percent of the tutor and athletic volunteers for the programs student: 
There is no better place for a youth development program to operate than on the campus 
of a prestigious, private, University!
Theory
According to Flailing and Harper (2013), “the first truly American theory of 
crime causation was developed in the city of Chicago. During the early part of the 20th
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century, the United States in general and Chicago in particular were undergoing major 
changes” (p. 70). People flocked to Chicago in search of work and the changes the city 
was undergoing made it something of a living laboratory for social scientists. Among the 
most famous of these social scientists were Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay (Frailing & 
Harper, 2013). Shaw and McKay built on the work of Ernest Burgess (1925), who 
postulated that cities grow outward from an inner core. As they do, various zones develop 
in which people live and work. The inner core serves at the center of business and 
industry. The zone immediately next to the inner core is comprised of inexpensive 
housing for those, particularly new arrivals, looking for work in the inner core. The third, 
fourth and fifth zones out from the inner core are comprised of housing for those who 
have acclimated to city life and have the resources to leave the zone adjacent to the inner 
core; by implication, the zone immediately next to the nner core is transitory (Frailing & 
Harper, 2014, pp. 74-75).
Shaw and McKay (1942) hypothesized that the transition zone, characterized as it 
was by poverty, heterogeneity, would have higher rates of juvenile delinquency than the 
other zones. Using a variety of indicators of juvenile delinquency, including referrals to 
juvenile court, truancy and recidivism, and then mapping the addresses of confirmed 
delinquents, Shaw and McKay found that, over time, rates of juvenile delinquency in the 
transition zone were higher than those of any of the other zones over time, regardless of 
who lived there (p. 76). Shaw and McKay called the transition zone socially 
disorganized, contending that poverty, heterogeneity and transiency undermined the 
organizing effects of social structures such as the family and educational and religious 
institutions (thus naming the theory). Since the pioneering studies of Shaw and McKay, a
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great deal of research has been done on the ecology of urban crime and delinquency. 
Studies and research data on urban crime remain an important part of criminological 
research. A trend in migration of both White and Black middle class resident, as well as 
industry and business, out of the large cities in suburban communities has resulted in 
even more deprivation, decay, and other conditions of social disorganization within the 
urban centers. This trend has left a population of the “truly disadvantaged” or “under 
class” with high rates of unemployment, welfare, support, and violence (Wilson & 
Howell, 1993).
Social disorganization does a poor job of explaining crime outside of high crime 
neighborhoods. It is particularly weak in explaining white collar crime, it also does a poor 
job of explaining why a vast majority of people who live in high crime neighborhoods are 
law abiding and why a small number of residents in these neighborhoods are the ones 
responsible for a vast majority of crime. Subcultural theories of crime, however, focus on 
the development of cultures that are distinct from the mainstream. Subcultural theories 
have their roots in the concepts of anomie and strain and at their essence, hold that some 
groups have values that approve or justify crime. These values permit commission of 
crime at high rates within these groups. A number of theorists have proposed subcultural 
explanations of crime, among them Albert Cohen.
Cohen (1955) postulated that young people from the lower socioeconomic classes 
have limited legitimate opportunities available to them in order to achieve middle class 
success. These youth are frustrated by their inability to achieve and form a subculture as a 
result that shuns middle class values. Cohen believes that the subculture substitutes its 
own values that are easier for its members to attain, values such as Cohen contends that
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much of the crime committed by lower class youths is expressive and not instrumental i n 
nature. Subcultural theories fit the mold most effectively in response to the phenomenon 
of youth gangs.
In the Northeast and Midwest, poor, mostly white fami es from Europe came to 
the United States in huge numbers between the period between the Revolution’s end and 
1860. People with shared nationalities and language clustered together in urban areas in 
the United States, forming the first areas called in slang terms “hoods” in cities. After 
being discriminated against by native-born Anglo-Americans, immigrants starting to 
cluster in neighborhoods. Conflict arose between native-born Anglo-Americans and the 
newly established immigrant groups (i.e., Irish) it lead to the creation of what we know 
today as gangs. During this same period (1780-1860), Mexican migration and 
immigration fueled gang development n the West. In the 1960s, immigration to the 
United States shifted from European points of origin to Central and South American and 
Asian points of origin. New Asian and Latin American immigrants settled in urban areas 
and some formed gangs, much in the same way earlier waves of immigrants did. The 
move away from an industrial economy in the United States at the same time meant 
fewer legitimate job opportunities for those wishing to earn a living wage, further 
disadvantaging some, especially those who were undereducated (Howell & Moore,
2010).
What does it mean to be who you are? An identity is the set of meanings that 
define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role in society, a member of a 
particular group, or claims particular characteristics that identify him or her as a unique 
person. For example, individuals have meanings that they apply to themselves when they
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are a student, worker, spouse, or parent (these are roles they occupy). People possess 
multiple identities because they occupy multiple roles, are members of multiple groups, 
and claim multiple personal characteristics; yet, members of society share the meanings 
of these i dentities. Identity theory seeks to explain the specific meanings that individuals 
have for the multiple identities they claim; how these identities relate to one another for 
any one person; how their identities influence their behavior, thoughts, and feelings or 
emotions; and how their identities tie them in to society at large (Burke & Stets, 2009, p.
In my thesis, I approach youth gang participation through the premises of social 
identity theory. The premise of social identity theory will be done by interpreting 
criminal and violent behavior among gang members as a group-based phenomenon, not 
in terms of engaging in these behaviors together at the same time (which may or may not 
happen), but rather in terms of one’s motivation to act. This can be done 
by examining intragroup dynamics of gangs and other peer groups that contribute to 
delinquency and violence. Hennigan and Spanovic (2011) revealed that group cohesion 
and group identification are associated with criminal and violent behavior among gang 
members, but not among members of other kinds of peer groups in the same 
neighborhoods. Social dentity theory maintains that this difference is due to different 
normative expectations within street gangs as opposed to non-gang peer groups. The 
stronger one’s dentification with the gang, the stronger the individual is focused on the 
gang’s normative expectations, regardless of individual concerns (Hennigan & Spanovic,
2011).
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While there are many explanations of why youth become involved in gangs, two 
reasons seem to be cited more than others. First, youth tend to join gangs for social 
reasons. Specifically, they may join because someone they know (a sibling, cousin, or 
friend) is already involved in a gang. Second, many youth have expressed their belief 
they will be safer as a gang member so they join for protection (Decker & Van Winkle, 
1996; Esbensen, 2009). Despite the belief that membership in a gang provides protection, 
those involved in gangs are far more likely to be victims of violent crime than people 
with similar backgrounds who do not participate in gang activity (Peterson et al., 2004). 
Thus, it can be hard to comprehend why individuals would join a group threatening their 
physical well being and even putting their life in jeopardy, when a basic human instinct is 
survival. Until recently, most research on gangs has been grounded in the disciplines of 
criminology, sociology, and public policy, drawing on theoretical frameworks such as: 
rational choice, cultural deviance, and social disorganization. I focus on the role played 
by social identity processes in promoting affiliation with gangs (Peterson et al., 2004).
While individual circumstances and characteristics play an important role, 
involvement i  gangs is also, above all, a group phenomenon. Because the interaction of 
individual and group processes is important in understanding gangs, social identity theory 
can provide a comprehensive picture of the unique dynamic of gangs. Social dentity 
theory is a social cognitive theory of group processes, intergroup relations, and collective 
self-conception (Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Reicher & Wetherell go on to say “ it 
defines groups cognitively as collections of individuals who share a common evaluative 
self-definition—a shared social identity” (p. 60).
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Chapter II 
LITERATURE REVIEW
National Youth Gang Center
Since the mid-20i! century, gang violence in this country has become 
widespread—all 50 states and the District of Columbia report gang problems, and reports 
have increased for 5 of the past 7 years (Howell, 2010). Despite the steady growth in the 
number and size of gangs across the United States (U.S.) and the criminal behavior and 
violence they spawn, little is known about the dynamics that drive gangs and how to best 
combat their growth. James C. Howell (2010), in Juvenile Justice Bulletin, presents a 
compilation of current research on gangs, including data on the state of gang problems in 
the United States today, why youth join gangs, the risk factors and attractions that 
increase youth’s propensity to join gangs, and how gangs form.
Local youth gang problems in the U.S. increased during the 25-year period 
leading up to the mid-1990s (Miller, 2001). Whereas in the 1970s, only 19 states reported 
youth gang problems, before the turn of the 21st century, all 50 states and the District of 
Columbia had acknowledged gang activity. Gang problems reported by law enforcement 
in the National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS) peaked in the mid-1990s, followed by a 
precipitous decline (Egley, Howell, & Major, 2004). An overall 15-percent increase in 
youth gang problems reported in the NYGS from 2002 to 2008 followed this decline, and 
all segments of the U.S. population reported
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increases in gang problems: suburban counties (22 percent), rural counties (16 percent), 
smaller cities (15 percent), and larger cities (13 percent) (Egley, Howell, & Moore,
2010). The National Gang Center estimates that 32.4 percent of all cities, suburban areas, 
towns, and rural counties (more than 3,330 jurisdictions, served by city and county law 
enforcement agencies) experienced gang problems in 2008. This represents a 15 percent 
increase from the 2002 figure. Approximately 774,000 gang members and 27,900 gangs 
are estimated to have been active in the U.S. in 2008. The number of gangs increased by 
28 percent, the number of gang members increased by 6 percent from 2002 to 2008,
774,000 gang members and 27,900 gangs (Egley, Howell, & Moore, 2010)
According to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 8 percent of the youth 
surveyed had belonged to a gang at some point between the ages of 12 and 17 (Snyder 
and Sickmund, 2006). A 1996 survey of nearly 6,000 eighth-graders conducted in 11 
cities with known gang problems found that 9 percent were currently gang members and 
17 percent said they had belonged to a gang at some point in their lives (Esbensen & 
Deschenes, 1998; Esbensen et al., 2011). The demographic characteristics of gang 
members vary by geographic location—mainly reflecting the demographic mak/eup of 
the youth population
According to the 2008 NYGS, half of all gang members are Hispanic/Latino, 32 
percent are African American/black, and 11 percent are Caucasian/White (National Gang 
Center, 2010). However, studies where youth self-report gang membership it reveals a 
much more equal proportions of race with Whites (7.3 percent), Blacks (8.3 percent), and 
Hispanics (9 percent), but multiracial groups had the largest percentage (12.9 percent) 
(Esbensen et al., 2009). To understand the sudden rise of youth gang activity, one must
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consider the factors that contribute to a youth’s decision to join a gang. According to 
Howell (2010), these factors fall in to two categories: attractions and risk. Contrary to a 
common public misconception most youth are not coerced into joining a gang. Most 
youth who join want to belong to a gang. Gangs are often at the center of appealing social 
action—parties, hanging out, music, drugs, and opportunities to socialize with members 
of the opposite sex. Youth reported the following reasons for joining a gang in the order 
of descending importance: for protection, for fun, for respect, for money, and because a 
friend was in the gang (Esbensen, Deschenes, & Winfree, 1999). Of these reasons, youth 
most commonly join gangs for the safety they believe the gang provides (Decker & Van 
Winkle, 1996). In a longitudinal assessment of the Gang Resistance Education and 
Training (G.R.E.A.T.) program, youth consistently reported protection as a reason for 
joining a gang (Peterson et al., 2004, pp. 793-815).
Violence is a regular occurrence in many of the environments where gangs exist, 
so, to avoid victimization, youth seek out gang membership for protection from rival 
gangs. As former “Zone 8” gang member, Yusef Shakur, stated in his memoir, Window 2 
My Soul, (2008):
The first corner we claimed to stick our Zone 8 “flag” on was on the side of a 
candy store. During the school year at a middle school, there was never a day that 
you didn’t see one of us representing on that corner. We strategically placed 
ourselves at this spot because of its vantage point: the students going to and 
returning from school couldn’t miss us. If we weren’t there, it was merely because 
we were being detained or hunted down by law enforcement. While on the block 
where the candy store stood, we would also take turns catching guys from across 
the Boulevard and put classic ass whippings on them as they also went to/returned 
from school. As for retribution, they could only retaliate by jumping us in the 
school. They were in our ’hood, so they were fair game. An original Zone 8 gang 
member’s attitude was that if he couldn’t catch one of them he was gonna kick 
their sisters’, brothers’, cousins’ or even girlfriends’ asses. This strategy left the 
guys across the Boulevard with no choice but to join one of the gangs in their 
’hood (p. 10).
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Yusef Shakur’s words illustrate a process of protection through intimidation that is
common to many gangs. They show how the actions of one gang can motivate youth to
join a rival gang for protection and also, in this instance, how the Zone 8 gang protected
their neighborhood, which, in turn, kept bigger situations from erupting in which the
police would be called. Gang affiliation and the process of protecting territory can also
foster a sense of identity and pride rooted in the connection to the community. Youth also
occasionally cite economic reasons such as selling drugs or making money, for joining a
gang (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). Apart from personal reasons for joining a gang,
media representations make gangs seem very appealing. The “hip” lifestyle and
portrayals of gangs and their members have a significant influence, particularly on more
susceptible youth, for reasons that Miller (2001) explains:
In the 1950s, the musical drama Wes! Side Story portrayed gang life as seen 
through the eyes of adult middle class writers and presented themes of honor, 
romantic love, and mild rebellion consistent with the values and perspective of 
these writers In the 1990’s, the substance of gang life was communicated to 
national audiences through a new medium known as gangsta rap. For the first 
time, youthful insiders, not adult outsiders portrayed this lifestyle. The character 
and values of gang life described by the rappers differed radically from the 
images of West Side Story. Language was rough and insistently obscene; women 
who were prostitutes to be used, beaten, and thrown away; and extreme violence 
and cruelty, the gang lifestyle, and craziness or insanity were glorified. Among 
the rappers’ targets of hatred, scorn, and murder threats were police, especially 
black police; other races and ethnic groups; society as a whole; and members of 
rival gangs... Gangsta rap strengthened the desire of youth to become part of a 
gang subculture that was portrayed by the rappers as a glamorous and rewarding 
lifestyle (p. 46).
Increased media popularization of gang culture has led to the point that now, 
“most young people in America recognize the look, the walk, and the talk of gang 
members. Many mimic it n part oi n whole, trying it out as a personal style” (Klein,
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2002, p. 246). The diffusion of street gang culture in modern-day movies, music, and 
clothing has served to i ntertwine gang culture with the general youth subculture. 
Operation Ceasefire
In 1995, Boston police faced a crisis of gang-related youth homicides. They 
teamed up with community groups and NIJ-funded researchers to apply an evidence- 
based, problem-solving approach to the problem. The working group included 
community-based, street-wise individuals familiar with the local gang culture, such as a 
police gang unit known as the Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF). The group struggled 
for months to design, implement and test an intervention; the result was Operation 
Ceasefire, which reduced firearm violence by 68 percent in one year. The two main 
elements of Ceasefire were (1) a direct attack on illicit firearms traffickers and (2) a set of 
intervention actions that gave gang members a strong deterrent to gun violence. Police 
placed strong and targeted enforcement pressure on gang members to discourage gun 
carrying. The researchers called this strategy "lever pulling" and called efforts to spread 
the word among gang members about increased enforcement "retailing." Operation 
Ceasefire was an innovative partnership between researchers and practitioners brought 
together to assess the city's youth homicide problem and implement an intervention 
designed to have a substantial near-term impact on the problem. Operation Ceasefire was 
based on the “lever pulling" deterrence strategy which focused criminal justice attention 
on a small number of chronically offending gang-involved youth responsible for much of 
Boston's youth homicide problem (Harvard Kennedy School, n.d.).
Given the disruptive influence that gangs pose on school safety and academic 
performance, gangs and associated violence are targets of prevention and intervention
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efforts. Several programs have been developed and promoted as “effective,” and school 
administrators are often confronted with promotional materials advocating the 
“marvelous” wide array of programs claiming to reduce youth gang activity, increase 
social skills, promote positive youth behavior, or all of the above. Whenever possible, 
these school administrators should be encouraged to choose programs with a history of 
evaluation findings supporting program effectiveness. Finn-Aage Esbensen, et al. (2013) 
presented a study of the same sort, showing an example of short- and long term findings 
from a recent randomized control trial (RCTs) assessing the effectiveness of a gang 
prevention program—Gang Resistance Education and Training (G.R.E.A.T, p. 376).
Before starting a program for delinquency and gang prevention, a community 
should conduct a gang problem assessment to identify elevated risk factors that lead to 
child delinquency and gang involvement. According to Howell (2012), “several studies 
strongly indicate that communities must define youth gangs, locate them, and identify 
and target the youth who are at a greater risk of joining” (p. 226). As part of its 
Comprehensive Gang Model, OJJDP has published^ Guide to Assessing Your 
Community’s Youth Gang Problem, a resource for communities conducting a gang- 
problem assessment (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2009a). This 
guide simplifies the data-collection process, helping communities determine types and 
levels of gang activity, and gaps in community services for gang prevention.
G.R.E.A.T.
Esbensen and Osgood (1999) conducted a retrospective 1-year study of the effects 
of G.R.E.A.T. among eighth graders who had and had not participated in the middle 
school program during seventh grade. Eleven sites were included in the study, identified
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through records indicating that at least two police officers had been trained to teach 
G.R.E.A.T. The cities include: Kansas City, Missouri; Las Cruces, New Mexico; 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Omaha, Nebraska; Orlando, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
Phoenix, Arizona; Pocatello, Idaho; Providence, Rhode Island; Torrance, California; and 
Will County, Illinois. In each of the sites, researchers selected schools that had offered 
G.R.E.A.T. programs during the past 2 years. All eighth-graders who attended school on 
the day the surveys were administered became part of the sample, with attendance 
ranging from 75 to 93 percent among the schools. The final sample was 5,935 eighth- 
graders in 315 classrooms from 42 schools (pp. 194-205).
Researchers randomly selected treatment classrooms in which the G.R.E.A.T 
program had been offered and selected comparison classrooms from among those that 
had not implemented the G.R.E.A.T. curriculum (or any other gang-related curriculum) 
No pretests of students’ attitudes or behavior were conducted. Analysis of students’ 
demographic variables revealed few significant differences between groups, with the 
exception of treatment students being significantly younger than comparison students and 
being marginally more likely to live only with their fathers. Survey questions contained 
items measuring self-reports of delinquency and gang membership (Esbensen, F. & 
Osgood, D., 1999, pp. 194-225).
Esbensen et al., (2001) conducted a second evaluation of the middle school 
G.R.E.A.T. program. Schools in six cities were selected for the study, based on the 
existence of a G.R.E.A.T. program in the city, geographic location, and the cooperation 
of the local school districts and police departments. The study sites included an East 
Coast city (Philadelphia), a West Coast city (Portland), the original G.R.E.A.T. city
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(Phoenix), a Midwestern city (Omaha), a "non-gang" city (Lincoln), and a small border 
city with chronic gang problems (Las Cruces). Classrooms were randomly assigned to the 
treatment or control group, and the analysis sample consisted of more than 3,500 students 
in 153 classrooms from 22 schools, roughly evenly divided between the treatment and 
control group. Because the G.R.E.A.T. program was implemented differently at each site 
(varying by class scheduling and structure of the schools), random assignment was 
implemented differently at each district and/or school (pp. 87-98).
Pretest surveys indicated that the treatment group held more negative beliefs 
about gangs, higher rates of self-reported status offenses (offenses specific to juveniles, 
e.g., school truancy, curfew violations, or running away from home), higher rates of 
delinquency among peers, and lower rates of pro-social behavior among peers. The initial 
post-test survey was conducted 2 weeks after the program was completed. Subsequently, 
students were surveyed once a year for 3 consecutive years. The follow-up surveys 
required active consents from the parents in all sites; the final rate for parental consent 
was 57 percent of the total initial sample (2,045 students). Eighty-six percent of children, 
who obtained parental consent, completed the initial post-test (1,761 students), with 
follow-up rates of 76 percent, 69 percent, and 67 percent in the first, second, and third 
follow-up years, respectively. The surveys included questions on self-reported gang 
activity, drug use, and delinquent behavior (Esbensen et. al., 2001, pp. 87-118).
In 2006, the University of Missouri-St. Louis was awarded a grant from the 
National Institute of Justice to determine what effect, if any, the G.R.E.A.T. program had 
on students. G.R.E.A.T., which is a 13-lesson general prevention program taught by 
uniformed law enforcement officers to middle school students, has three stated goals: 1)
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to reduce gang membership, 2) to reduce delinquency, especially violent offending, and 
3) to improve students’ attitudes toward the police. To assess program effectiveness, the 
study mounted a multi-strategy research design that included the following components: 
1) assessment of G.R.E.A.T. officer training; 2) surveying of officers teaching the 
program and teachers and school administrators n whose classrooms and schools the 
program was delivered; 3) observation of more than 500 classroom sessions; and 4) a 
randomized control trial including 3,280 students nested in 195 classrooms in 31 schools 
in 7 cities (Esbensen et al., 2012, p. 2).
In previous publication, Esbensen et al., (2012), reported on the results of the one- 
year post program treatment effects. At that point they had found statistically significant 
differences between the treatment and control students on 14 out of 33 attitudinal and 
behavioral outcomes. These results can be considered quite favorable and reflect 
sustained program effects, 1-year post program. Ebsensen et al., (2012) multi-component 
evaluation found that G.R.E.A.T. program is implemented as it is intended and has the 
intended program effects on youth gang membership and on a number of risk factors and 
social skills thought to be associated with gang membership. Results 1-year post program 
showed a 39 percent reduction in odds of gang joining among students who received the 
program compared to those who did not and an average of 24 percent reduction in odds 
of gang joining across the 4 years post-program (Ebsensen et al, 2012, p. 5).
“The G.R.E.A.T. program is a school-based gang- and violence-prevention 
program with three primary goals: (1) to teach youth to avoid gang membership; (2) to 
prevent violence and criminal activity; (3) to assist youth in developing positive 
relationships with law enforcement” (Esbensen et al., 2013, p. 377). Developed as a
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universal prevention program targeting youth in early adolescence, the G.R.E. A T. 
program was classified as a gang-awareness program.
The original G.R.E. A T program, developed by Phoenix-area police departments 
in 1991, was a cognitive-based program that taught students about crime and its effect on 
victims, cultural diversity, conflict resolution skills, meeting basic needs (without a 
gang), responsibility, and goal setting. The G.R.E.A T. program s similar in nature to the 
well-known D.A.R.E. program. Uniformed law enforcement officers teach the program’s 
eight-lesson curriculum in 1-hour sessions over a 9-week period. Although there are other 
components directed at lower grade levels, the primary curriculum component is located 
in middle schools, taught for the most part to seventh and sometimes sixth graders 
(Peterson & Esbensen, 2004, p. 221). G.R.E. A.T. is designed to enable youth to make 
sound decisions, avoid conflicts, be responsible, set positive goals, resist peer pressure, 
and develop positive attitudes toward police officers. Its goal is prevention of violence, 
especially that which is associated with gang activity. Though G.R.E.A T. has proven 
effective in all of these categories when youth have already joined gang activity police 
departments must be aware of how the ever changing social media landscape effects of 
youth gangs. For example, texting has become a major form of communication whether 
on the form or adapting how gangs communicate via notes in prison:
Tweeners
Gang members are grooming recruits as young as second graders according to a 
study cited in The Oklahoman (Nov 2009), though most frequently targeted are the 
“tweeners” in fifth -  seventh grade age range. The link to schools is crucial to gangs not 
only for recruiting purposes, but also as a key drug distribution channel. School
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infiltration is so valuable that law enforcement agencies in several states report gangs are 
di reeling teenage members who had dropped out of school to reenroll, primarily to recruit 
new members and sell drugs. These kids typically use cellular phones to conduct drug 
transactions and prearrange meetings with customers. The most recent statistics from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for Education only shows data 
through 2005, but we should expect to see stark increases in their next biennial repoi 
“We’re seeing the gang members coming back from prison looking more and more to 
those middle-schoolers and the younger kids to recruit them,” said Susan Manheimer San 
Mateo Police Chief, who speaks for the San Mateo County gang task force (McNutt, 
2009).
Gang leaders know kids socialize on sites such as Facebook and YouTube, and 
they are actively reaching out through popular online services to create a new generation 
of gang members. They describe gang life as glamorous, and seductive. Recruiters tell of 
a life of power, leisure, and wealth, and instant gratification, as well as a ‘family’ and a 
sense of belonging and acceptance that many kids desperately want. They glorify the 
danger and the excitement. Gangs have pushed hard to make gang clothing a fashion 
statement to such an extent that gang apparel can be seen everywhere as a fashion 
statement for young people -  on MTV and other teen sites and stations. Gangs use 
images of rap artists like Snoop Dogg, and promote music with gang themes, violence 
and attire. Many of today’s youth who are not connected with gangs wear the gang styles 
and colors because of the “cool factor.” Certainly wearing the fashion does not make a 
kid a gang member, however, wearing gang fashion can have tragic consequences when 
kids are mistaken for being a member of a rival gang (McNutt, 2009).
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For the most part, gangs use the same sites everyone else does -  MySpace, 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and so on. There are tens of thousands of websites, 
message boards and chat rooms created by gang members or young gang “wannabe’s.” 
These ‘web-banging’ ‘cyberbanging’ ‘netbanging’ ‘phone-banging’ sites are typically set 
to public viewing, and are places to hang out online like everyone else -  but with the 
“gangsta” culture and violence highly glorified through photos, music, gang signs, guns, 
tattoos, colors, videos, etc. They frequently contain memorials to gang members who 
have been killed or are incarcerated. The videos and photos posted may just be about the 
‘life,’ but they frequently include documentation of crimes they want to brag about 
beatings, robberies, graffiti, etc. where everyone in the video has their face covered to 
avoid identification. The sites are also used to trash rivals and convey threats and 
intimidate ‘bystanders’ (McNutt, 2009)
The fact that so many gangs identify themselves on different websites makes each 
gang relatively easy prey to predators or rival gangs who can quickly profile them and 
use these websites. Making social media a new battle ground -  a turf to defend from 
being trashed or hijacked. Hacking into and disrespecting a rival gang’s site is just one 
more field of engagement. The threats and disrespect exchanged online are creating a 
new cause for offline violence as gang members settle disagreements that started online. 
Gang sites often use a kind of cryptic language that has evolved between gang members 
enabling them to convey messages on public sites through language and inferences that 
others will not understand. The actual number of hard-core gang sites is hard to estimate, 
but is assumed to be only a couple of thousand. These sites are private and much harder 
to monitor. These are used to plan crimes -  the kills and raids on rivals, and the long list
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of crimes cited above, plus provide a place to brag about their past crimes and document 
the gang’s ‘history.’ Cell phones have become as essential to gang members making their 
organized crime endeavors much more accessible to a vaster population inside the gang. 
Gang members may have several prepaid phones and calling cards to ensure their calls 
are untraceable for any communications about criminal activities, and easily 
disposable. They use encrypted internet technologies like VoiceOverIP (VoIP) on 
products like Skype on their mobile phones or computers to avoid wiretapping -  making 
it nearly impossible for law enforcement to track their actions or crimes.
Furthermore, gangs use cell phones cameras and video to document crimes or 
collect information for future crimes, and use GPS coordinate attacks and crimes, as well 
as surreptitiously monitor those they think might be ratting them out. They use cell 
phones to assist in robberies, for extortion, as evidence of accomplished hits, to arrange 
drug deals, set up transactions, prostitute girls and boys, commit identity theft, and more. 
Gangs have been known to place a member inside a bank, (or near an ATM, or any other 
place that cash is transacted) to take photos of likely victims and watch to see who 
withdraws large sums, then send it to another gang member sitting outside the banks to 
identify the victim to follow and rob. Gangs also use cell phones to communicate with 
members behind bars, allowing incarcerated gang leaders to continue to conduct 
business, and for members outside to request hits against rivals also serving time. Though 
cell phones are illegal, prisons appear to have a very hard time of preventing them from 
getting into the hands of incarcerated gang members (Thomas, Date, & Venkataraman, 
2007).
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Klivans (2014) wrote an article after receiving an eight-page confiscated note 
from a correctional facility. The note contains encryptions. Gang codes change, adapt and 
mutate just as any language does. As new words and concepts are added to language, 
they are also added to communications that gang members write in code. Gang codes 
have long used street and prison slang as part of the communication process. Now with 
the popularity of “texting” in our society, we see that texting abbreviations are being 
added to gang documents and written in code. As Klivans examined these pages, he 
noticed that the document was written i  a mix of English alphabet letters and code 
symbols. When you crack a gang code and identify the symbols used in the code, 
transcribing the document is just the start of understanding the content. You are goi ng to 
have to be familiar with street and prison slang and now.. .the next thing is texting. This 
new discovery is something G.R.E.A.T. will want to consider as they continue to try and 
deter youths from joining gangs. Furthermore, social media, in addition to texting, will be 
used to advance gang conversations and the knowledge will be brought on by the youth 
members of gangs (Klivan, 2014, p. 1).
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Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY
Strategic Action Plan
Because research has been limited and because researchers have no real 
consensus on the definition of a gang or a gang incident, the scope and seriousness of the 
youth gang problem are not reliably known. Law enforcement and media reports suggest 
that criminal youth gangs are active in nearly every state. Youth gangs exist in large, 
mid-size, and small communities and in suburban areas. Youth gangs and gang incidents 
are defined in different ways in different communities. Key aspects of youth gang 
behavior are its prevalence in violent crimes, such as homicide and aggravated assault, 
and its concentration in some neighborhoods. The close relationship of gangs, violence, 
and a significant crime problem are most evident, however, when the criminal records of 
youth gang members are compared with those youths who are not in gangs. Youth gang 
membership is associated with significantly higher levels of delinquency and index 
crimes. The rate of violent offenses for gang members is three times as high as for non­
gang delinquents. Even gang members without delinquency records have higher adjusted 
frequencies of hidden delinquency than do non-gang youth with delinquent records 
(Klivans, 2014).
The Summary of the Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Preventi on ’ s National Juvenile Justice Action Plan (Action Plan) from 1996 presents 
innovative and effective strategies designed to reduce violence and victimization.
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Through these efforts, communities and citizens are working to bring about 
positive change. They established neighborhood watches and citizen patrols and working 
with law enforcement and other agencies to close down drug houses, communities 
cleaned up playgrounds and parks and creating drug- and weapon-free school zones.
Also, they formed community planning teams to identify risk factors for delinquency, 
assess resources and needs, and provide programs designed to prevent juvenile 
involvement in delinquency and crime (Bilchik, 1996).
The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan, created opportunities for youth to take 
part in community-building activities. In concert with community oriented policing and 
strict accountability for offenders, these local prevention efforts are our nation’s most 
effective long-term weapons against crime and violence. According to Bilchik (1996), 
“although the public is deeply concerned about juvenile violence and victimization, many 
Americans do not know how they can help. Because the effects of juvenile violence are 
felt by entire communities, the search for solutions must be a communitywide effort, and 
every citizen needs to be involved” (p. 2). The Action Plan supports State, local, and 
community-based implementation of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention’s (OJJDP’s) Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic 
Juvenile Offenders (Wilson & Howell, 1993) and Howell’s follow-up 1995 published, 
Guide for Implementing the Comprehensive Strategy for Serious, Violent, and Chronic 
Juvenile Offenders (Howell, 1995), which provide a framework for establishing a 
continuum of programs and services designed to reverse the trend of increased juvenile 
violence and delinquency. Thq Action Plan, summarized in this section, is an eight-point 
statement of objectives and strategies designed to strengthen state and local initiatives to
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reduce juvenile violence, increase the capacity of the juvenile justice system to respond, 
and prevent delinquency. The primary audiences for the Action Plan are state and local 
leaders, juvenile justice practitioners, and community members who are initiating or 
engaging in these activities and are seeking guidance, support, and resources.
The eight objectives of the strategic action plan are as follow
• Objective 1 - provides immediate intervention and appropriate sanctions 
and treatment for delinquent juveniles.
• Objective 2 - prosecutes certain serious, violent, and chronic juvenile 
offenders in criminal court.
• Objective 3 - reduce youth involvement with guns, drugs, and gangs.
• Objective 4 - provides opportunities for children and youth.
• Objective 5 - break the cycle of violence by addressi ng youth 
victimization, abuse, and neglect.
• Objective 6 - strengthens and mobilizes communities.
• Objective 7 - supports the development of innovative approaches to
research and evaluation.
• Objective 8 - implement an aggressive public outreach campaign on 
effective strategies to combat juvenile violence (Howell, 1995).
Based off the failure of the above strategic action plan, the proposed program 
suggests no city should endorse any particular program. Instead, each city should find a 
program containing a few common attributes. A program that points toward effective 
actions we can take to reduce youth violence. The most effective route toward reducing 
the harm caused by gangs requires a more realistic grasp of the challenges that gangs
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pose. The objective should not be to eradicate gangs—an impossible task—but rather to 
promote community safety. Furthermore, to reduce youth violence communities should 
expand the use of evidenced-based practice. Evidence-based practices are those 
interventions that are scientifically proven to reduce juvenile recidivism and promote 
positive outcomes for young people. Rather than devoting more resources to gang 
suppression and law enforcement tactics, researchers recommend targeting funding to 
support research-based programs operated by agencies in the health and human services 
sector. As Peter Greenwood (2007), former director of the RAND Corporation’s Criminal 
Justice Program and an evaluator of Operation Ceasefire in Los Angeles, notes, “Delays 
in adopting proven programs will only cause additional victimization of citizens and 
unnecessarily compromise the future of additional youth” (Ludwig & Cook, 2007).
One city that never embraced the heavy-handed suppression tactics chosen 
elsewhere has experienced far less gang violence. In New York City, a variety of street 
work and gang intervention programs were fielded decades ago during a period when 
gang violence was on the rise. These strategies were solidly grounded in principles of 
effective social work practices that fall outside the realm of law enforcement, and they 
seem to have helped dissuade city policy makers and police officials from embracing 
most of the counterproductive gang suppression tactics adopted elsewhere. No seasoned 
New Yorker would deny the existence of street gangs. But gang-related offenses 
represent just a tiny blip on the New York crime screen. “Gang experts conclude that the 
city’s serious problem with street gang violence had largely faded away by the end of the 
1980s. Youth violence remains a problem in some New York City neighborhoods, but 
with crime falling to historic lows, the city’s approach to gangs and youth crime seems to
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be remarkably effective” (Greene & Pranis, 2007, p. 6). There is no “magic bullet” to end 
gang crime, but both the lessons from the past (i.e., 1996 OJJDP Strategic Action Plan) 
and results from research on more recent innovations in juvenile justice policy point 
toward more effective public safety strategies.
East Palo Alto Tennis and Tutoring
The hope of providing safe schools for the nation's youth is atop the priority list 
for every educator in the country. But in the last few years, law-enforcement and public 
school officials have experienced an epidemic of youth violence that is quickly spreading 
from inner cities to the suburbs. Gang activity not only means unsightly graffiti, but 
accelerated crime and dropout rates, the deterioration of neighborhoods, parks, and 
playgrounds, and wasted human resources everywhere. Gangs are no longer just the 
problem of those who live in the crime-ridden neighborhoods where the gangs thrive; 
they are now everyone's problem. Los Angeles is regarded as the nation's gang violence 
capital, and has been the focal point and 'guinea pig' of prevention programs and 
solutions, however, from a personal experience of living on Stanford University’s 
campus and working for an after school tennis and tutoring program from 2010-2012.
• In 1988, Jeff Arons founded East Palo Alto Tennis and Tutoring (EPATT) 
Arons, a former Stanford tennis All-American, originally conceived 
EPATT as a “summer, tennis-only” program, conducted on leftover courts 
of the closed Ravenswood High School. Over the past 27 years EPATT 
has undergone a number of changes. Full timeline is available on their 
website epatt.org.
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1990 - Money raised to build four courts, the only courts in East Palo 
Alto! EPATT became a year-round program.
1991 - also adding academic component. Hired first Academic Director, 
Dee Dee Terzian.
1992 - East Palo Alto earns title of “Murder Capital of the United 
States" for having the highest per capita murder rate in the U.S.
1993 - Initiated Annual Dinner fundraiser. Built four more courts at Cesar 
Chavez Academy to meet demand.
1994 - Added after-school tutoring by Stanford students via Haas Center 
for Public Service students in Chavez school classrooms. Over 70 
Stanford University students are transported to East Palo Alto weekly to 
provide academic tutoring for students.
1995 - EPATT receives first national recognition by being featured 
nationally on CNN and "CBS Evening News” as a symbol of hope for the 
East Palo Alto. EPATT featured in Tennis Magazine for the first time as 
well.
1997- Courts removed space needed due to mandated class size reduction 
to 25 to make space for portable classrooms, parking, etc. Classrooms 
used for after-school tutoring burned down (EPATT History, 2011).
1998 - Stanford Men’s Tennis Head Coach and founding chair, Dick 
Gould moves EPATT program to Stanford University’s new Taube Tennis 
Center, with a new Executive Director and a new Academic Director.
28
1999 - one million dollars raised in one evening to build out classrooms 
under tennis stadium seating and to lights the tennis courts.
2000 - Staff offices move from Haas Center to Taube Tennis
Center. Vans donated for transporting EPA students to Stanford. Original 
format expanded to include one and a half hours of daily after school one- 
on-one tutoring by Stanford students and 1 hour of daily tennis instruction. 
Over 100 students and 100 tutors involved dail>
2002 - Named one of top three tennis and tutoring programs in U.S. by 
Tennis Week Magazine. 2003 -  EPATT implements its Parent 
Component.
2004 - Receives Stanford University’s first Annual “Community Service 
Award” as a benchmark outreach program.
2008 - Named by First Serve as nation’s #1 after-school tennis and 
tutoring program. Considered the model such program in the U.S., and 
visited by people from throughout the country to see “how EPATT 
works.”
2009 - After 12 years under the YTA organization, EPATT becomes an 
independent non-profit 501(c)(3) organization. Stanford signs 5-year 
facility use extensioi
2011 - EPATT conducted introductory tennis on resurrected court space 
and basic group academics in EPA. During 2012 U.S. Open tennis 
tournament, CBS Sports aired a nationwide tribute to Arthur Ashe 
featuring a special film about EPATT (EPATT History, 2011).
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Violence in East Palo Alto often takes the form of shootings, and inter-gang 
disputes nearly always involve “turf,” or areas in the city where gangs can sell drugs. The 
gangs have changed over time, however, based on generational and demographic shifts.
In the 1980s, East Palo Alto was home to the Midtown Hogs, a predominantly African 
American gang whose primary source of income was crack cocaine. The Midtown Hogs 
are partly blamed for the city’s crack epidemic of the late eighties and early nineties. 
Midtown Hogs evolved into the Taliban, which most recently fought Da Vill, another 
predominantly African American gang, and Sac Street, aNorteno subset, according to 
members of the San Mateo County Gang Task Force, who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity because they often work undercover (LeVine, 2014).
East Palo Alto’s demographic shift has helped determine which gangs pervade the 
city. In recent years, African-American gangs spread to other parts of the Bay Area, 
while Latino gangs stayed closer to home. Although most gangs are divided along racial 
lines, some, like “Sac Street,” have absorbed African Americans and Latinos who live on 
Sacramento Street. Drugs, principally marijuana, are the gangs’ primary financial 
pipelines, according to the task force. Task force members said a handful of families 
living in East Palo Alto have connections to Mexican cartels, which smuggle drugs across 
the border and give them to gang members to sell on city streets. Most of the clientele is 
not from East Palo Alto, the task force explained. Located along Highway 101, the city is 
a convenient stopping point for outsiders to make a quick purchase and then speed away 
(LeVine, 2014).
While the Nortenos funnel some drug funds to Nuestra Familia, a Mexican - 
American gang operating from state and federal prisons, much of the money is spent on
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accessories that promote image. One task force member recalls finding a closet filled 
with Air Jordan’s, each pair worth around $100. Angel Santuario, a community organizer 
for Peninsula Interfaith Action, said “bling” gives gang members status. “Some of it may 
be about liberation and freedom,” he said. “There’s a huge need n our communities to 
feel respected, to feel like we have dignity. For some of those folks, that’s why they go 
out and buy brand new Nikes. It’s to be respected in their world” (LeVine, 2014, pp. 1-3).
The most successful strategies for dealing with gangs are those, which emphasize 
prevention and intervention instead of suppression and enforcement. Loading up the 
environment with police officers doesn't work either. In 1992, just 2 hours before New 
York's Mayor Dinkins was to address a high school student body, another student shot 
and killed two classmates. At the time of the shootings, there were 17 police officers in 
the building not to mention other security personnel and precautions taken especially 
since the mayor was on the high school campus! Research has shown that increased 
incarceration does not do much good. If anything, incarceration gives the individual 
prestige among peers. The publicity that gang violence generates satisfies the adolescent 
hunger for recognition and attention. This hunger for attention may have sparked the 
recent outbreak of suburban school shootings. "Kids like to have their names in the paper, 
even if someone is killed..." said one youngster to the Boston Globe. Others brag about 
things they have done and like to portray themselves as public enemy number one. But 
treating gangs as a public enemy may encourage gang membership because of the 
widespread publicity and notoriety furnished by that sort of reaction (LeVine, 2014).
Part of the frustration experienced by adolescents who join gangs is that their 
academic skills are usually way below par. Thus, mentoring programs, peer tutoring, kids
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helping other kids, is one inexpensive way of serving youngsters and helping them raise 
their confidence. The EPATT (East Palo Alto Tennis Tutoring) is a mentor program that 
pairs Stanford students with East Palo Alto kids in an attempt to offer them positive role 
models, after school homework help, and sports activity. Although its main goal is not 
gang prevention, it does prevent kids from joining gangs.
Though it remains one of the few places in the Silicon Valley where housing costs 
are within reach for low-income families, East Palo Alto has seen dramatic change in 
recent decades. Latinos make up the majority in the once-predominantly Black city, and 
even this demographic shift might be fleeting. The latest tech boom has caused home 
prices to soar, as start-ups and behemoths like Facebook encroach along the city’s edges, 
pricing out longtime residents.
The demand for housing among skilled tech workers would have been 
unfathomable in 1992, when the city boasted the country’s highest murder rate. Since 
then, East Palo Alto has seen a dramatic drop in crime, including 345 fewer homicides, 
rapes, armed assaults and robberies in 2011 than in 1992. But one problem persists — the 
city has struggled to lose its unwanted reputation as a center for gang activity in San 
Mateo County. In 2012, the situation became particularly acute for residents, some of 
who found themselves living in a war zone. The number of assaults involving a weapon 
jumped from 129 to 230 between 2011 and 2012, and again remained high last year 
(Crime Statistics City of Palo Alto, 2013).
In March 2011, East Palo Alto implemented Operation Ceasefire; a federally 
funded initiative designed to target and motivate youth with violent pasts to reshape their 
lives. Kimberly Smith, the former director of Operation Ceasefire, managed the
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program’s law enforcement side and served as an intermediary between the city and the 
county. One of the program’s initial challenges was to relieve tension between the need 
to promote community relations and the need to crack down on gang violence, she said. 
“The community was very sensitive to having a lot of people all of a sudden being 
labeled as gang members,” Smith said. “That created pushback and resistance” (LeVine, 
2014, p. 71).
Further complicating matters is that the city’s Latino population — about 65 
percent — has trust issues with the police, said Angel Santuario of Peninsula Interfaith 
Action, a community nonprofit. Santuario has heard complaints that the department 
makes it difficult for citizens to report suspected criminal activity anonymously. Because 
residents fear retribution, they are reluctant to come forward. City Councilman Ruben 
Abrica believes community-policing programs have helped improve those relations. In 
March, after rumors circulated that the city might outsource police services to the county 
Sheriffs Office, hundreds showed up at a council meeting to protest. “It’s not every day 
the community comes out to defend the police,” Abrica said. “Even young people were 
saying that the Police Department is not perfect but we can work with the 
police”(LeVine, 2014, p. 71).
Community groups, notably members of the clergy and youth organizations, 
helped close gaps between the community and the police, according to Smith and Melvin 
Gaines, the department’s special projects manager. Gaines said community policing 
reflects a change in a past mentality that police officers could “arrest [their] way out of a 
problem.” Operation Ceasefire approached 83 potential participants, many with gang 
backgrounds. Forty-eight agreed to take part and 18 remain active. Two of the suspects
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arrested in Operation Sunny Day were Ceasefire candidates, according to Gaines. The 
grant money for Operation Ceasefire ran out in December 2013. Although the city 
reapplied, the application was not approved because “other agencies had more 
compelling proposals,” Gaines said in a June Peninsula Press interview (LeVine, 2014).
Reliance on such money poses its own challenges, he added. While grants allow 
for East Palo Alto to experiment with a range of community initiatives, the city is also 
under constant pressure to find a steady source of funding. Sarah Lawrence, the director 
of UC Berkeley’s School of Law’s Policy Analysis and Program Evaluation, sees little 
alternative, saying this is the “nature of federal, local and state dynamics of funding 
streams.” Looking back, Smith thinks Operation Ceasefire could have been more 
successful had law enforcement been more aggressive. “The whole message of Ceasefire 
is that ‘we hope you guys get some assistance [but] if you call our bluff we’re coming 
after you,”’ she said. “And we never went after anyone.” While she does not advocate for 
a “police state,” Smith said, having a greater number of police officers on the street is an 
inherent deterrent (LeVine, 2014, p. 72).
A very different approach has grown tremendous support here in Georgia. The 
premise based on a get-tough theory of criminology and deterrence. If you’re in a gang, 
and you’re living in northeast Georgia, Bibb County District Attorney David Cooke has a 
message for you. “We’re coming.” Cooke suspected even before he took office in 
January 2013, that gangs were the number one problem with crime in Macon and since 
taking office they have been his number one priority. From the beginning, Cooke brought 
in Michael Carlson from the Atlanta Metro area as a consultant, who literally wrote the 
book on how the Georgia evidence codes work, to help guide him and his staff. Carlson
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has used his techniques to reduce homicides by 40 percent in DeKalb County and is 
currently prosecuting cases in Cobb County. With roughly half of all felony crimes in 
Bibb County being gang motivated, Cooke has a lot of chances to rid the community of 
gangs, that’s for sure. Since taking office, Cooke has yet to lose a conviction of a gang 
related incident (Knowles, 2014).
At the crux of Cooke’s strategy is to prosecute more and more offenders under 
Georgia statute (§16:15:1), commonly known as “The Georgia Street Gang and 
Terrorism Prevention Law,” which allows Cooke to not only enhance penalties for 
certain crimes but more importantly allows Cooke to tie anything gang related to the 
criminal in open court and virtually bring out in court anything and everything a gang 
does. One way that Cooke is going after them is to re-indict old cases and add gang 
charges on them like he did in getting a conviction on Cedric Sherrod Newton, Jr. for the
2012 slaying of Udondra Hargrove, a former member of the Crips who was trying to get 
his life straight. Newton was a member of a rival gang called the “Mafia” (Knowles, 
2014).
DeShala Dixon, another Bibb County Assistant District Attorney (ADA), was the 
main prosecutor in the case of gang member Bernard Bullard, a member of the “East Side 
Mafia” who was convicted for kill ing John Johnson III, a rival gang member of the 
Crips. It took a jury 2 hours to find him guilty of the murder along with possession of a 
firearm during the commission of a felony, another “add-on” thanks to the Gang 
Act. Once again, Judge Howard Simms gave the maximum sentence of life without 
parole plus 20 years. Simms, before sentencing, told Bullard that the people of Bibb 
County are tired of “the shooting and the killing.. .they’re tired of it and so am I.” Cooke
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went on to say, “I hope every young person takes note of what the judge had to say” 
(Knowles, 2014).
Just this past week, Cooke’s efforts paid huge dividends to the Macon 
community, as his office has filed indictments that include several gang related charges in 
connection to a prostitution ring headed by Sidney Raymond Sapp, the alleged leader of a 
local gang called “M.O.E.” or “Money Over Everything.” Cooke also ndicted Sapp’s 
mother Jerryetta, his sisters Justeene and Asialeena, as well as his baby’s mother 
Jacquelyn Charmain Johnson. Sidney, along with another M.O.E. gang member Navon 
Christine Johnson are being charged with rape, child molestation, statutory rape, pimping 
for a person under the age of 18, trafficking of persons for sexual servitude as well as two 
counts of violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. Everyone else was 
indicted for keeping a place of prostitution for a person under 18, pandering as well as 
prostitution (Knowles, 2014).
On February 22, in another gang related case, 16-year-old Damion Clayton was 
killed at the Macon Little League field on Anthony Road. Indicted the week of March 
16, 2015, for the murder are gang members Jeddarius Treonta Meadows, Trayvon Xavier 
Sparks and Roland Watson. Meadows and Watson are reportedly members of the “Fuck 
Life” gang and Starks is reportedly a Crip. Clayton, the victim, was targeted 3 months 
before his murder in another shooting on Cedar Avenue which killed 16 year old Alyssa 
Jackson instead. Both murders are the result of a turf war over the Bloomfield area 
(Knowles, 2014).
According to a 2012 report given by the Macon Police Department to Macon City 
Council, and according to both David Cooke and Macon-Bibb Sheriff David Davis, there
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are three main youth gangs that inhabit Macon called “The Bloods” “The Crips” and 
“The Mafia” with over 400 sub-gangs, or “hybrids.” The hybrids have names like “Alley 
Boys” and the above mentioned “Money Over Everything” gang as well as the “3400 
Gang” of Pendleton Homes, a housing project on Houston Ave and “The Fort Hill 
Bloods,” obviously located in Fort Hill. The gangs leave no area in Macon alone and can 
be found in Unionville, Village Green, and East Macon and among every other section of 
Macon-Bibb. Davis states that there has been a definite shift of activity as the East 
Macon/Fort Hill area used to be the location of the most gang activity. The 'hot bed' has 
now moved to the Bloomfield area and East Macon has 'calmed down' a good bit 
(Knowles, 2014). In South Georgia, youth gangs continue to grow more and more 
susceptible to growth based on a number of facts: migrations from northern gang 
members, the influx of youth gang membership in metropolitan areas such as 
Jacksonville (FL), and finally, the constant growth of Lowndes County with a matching 
gang task force budget staying the same.
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Chapter IV 
RESULTS
Data
Criminal youth gangs are active ft nearly every state and the following research 
will show the factors influencing gang violence, changes in gang estimates over a decade 
of research, average age of youth gang members and more. Before addressing the first of 
the data collected, this paper sets out to address the scope of the problem.
Research has been limited and because researchers have no real consensus on the 
definition of a gang or gang incident, the scope and seriousness of the youth gang 
problem are not reliably known. Law enforcement and media reports found in 
researching this problem suggest that criminal youth gangs are active in nearly every 
state, as well as American territories such as Puerto Rico. Youth gangs exist in all type of 
communities and suburban areas. They may be present in one city but absent or less 
active in another seemingly similar community. Gangs operate in city, county, State, and 
Federal detention and corrections facilities. They operate in the vicinity of many schools, 
generally carrying out their activities near rather than within schools.
According to the research conducted by U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (1994), youth gangs and gang incidents are 
defined in different ways in different communities. Researchers who conducted a survey 
of 45 cities and six cities found that most frequently mentioned elements of a definition 
include certain group or organizational characteristics, such as symbols and a range of 
criminal activities, particularly violence and drug use and sales. “Of 35 discrete cities and 
jurisdictions with organized programs to combat emerging and chronic gang problems,
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law enforcement officials estimated that the U.S. has some 1,439 gangs and 120, 636 
gang members. African Americans (54.6 percent) and Hispanics (32.6 percent), mainly 
Mexican Americans, were the major racial/ethnic groups in the gang populations reported 
by law enforcement officials” (Bilchik, 1997, p.l). Two-thirds of the law enforcement 
respondents in this same survey perceived gangs as affiliated across neighborhoods, 
cities, or states. They stated that 75 percent of youth gang members had prior police 
records and that youth gang members committed 11.3 percent of FBI index crimes in 
their jurisdictions. However, the gang problem is not limited to juveniles; adults were 
reported to be involved in 45.6 percent of youth gang incidents (Bilchik, 1997, p. 1).
Although gang members with arrest records were responsible for a 
disproportionate amount of violent crime, the proportion of total violent crime committed 
by gang members is still estimated to be fairly low. However, statistics on violent crimes 
committed by gang members depended in large measure on the local definitions of gang 
incidents. Key aspects of youth gang behavior are its prevalence in violent crimes, such 
as homicide and aggravated assault, and its concentration in certain types of 
neighborhoods. Gang homicides, using a broad and inclusive definition, such as that used 
in Los Angeles, have ranged between 25 and 30 percent of all of the city’s homicides in 
recent years. In a city with a more restrictive definition of gang incidents, such as 
Chicago, the average is about 10 percent (Bilchik, 1997).
The close relationship of gangs, violence, and a significant crime problem are 
most evident, however, when the criminal records of youth gang members are compared 
with those youths who are not in gangs. Youth gang membership is associated with 
significantly higher levels of delinquency and index crimes. According to the 1995
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survey, “The rate of violent offenses for gang members is three times as high as for non­
gang delinquents. Even gang members without delinquency records have higher adjusted 
frequencies of hidden delinquency than do non-gang youth” (Bilchik, 1997, p. 8).
The primary source of law enforcement reports on the prevalence of gang 
problems is the (NYGS). The survey is distributed annually to all law enforcement 
agencies that serve suburban counties and cities with 50,000 or more residents, along 
with a random sample of police departments that serve small cities and rural counties. 
Each agency is asked to describe the nature of the local youth gang problem and estimate 
the number and demographic characteristics of gangs and gang members in its 
jurisdiction. Respondents are told to exclude motorcycle gangs, prison gangs, hate 
groups, and gangs composed entirely of adults from their reports. Response rates have 
ranged from 84 to 92 percent since 1996 (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006). The National 
Youth Gang Center (NYGC) uses National Youth Gang Survey (NYGS) data to examine 
the prevalence of gang problems by type of jurisdiction and to estimate the number of 
gangs and gang members in the U.S. The strength of gang prevalence and population 
estimates is limited by the quality of law enforcement data. Local estimates of gang 
membership can fluctuate from year to year based on shifting definitions of gang activity 
and changes in the capacity to track it. I will examine the first 10 years of the data from 
1995-2005 below and then re-visit the latest NYGS conducted in 2012 to show 
significant year-to-year variation in the number of gang members. Arlen Egley, a senior 
research associate, explains the “significant year-to-year reports by a given jurisdiction 
often reflects a ‘change in approach’ rather than a change in the gangs themselves” 
(Greene & Pranis, 2007, pp. 33-34).
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Sharp year-to-year changes in local gang population estimates are excellent 
fodder for sensational media reports but say little about the severity of a local gang 
problem. Deborah Lamm Weisel and Tara O’Connor Shelley (2004) warn “while it is 
tempting to use law enforcement data about gangs and gang-related offenses to make 
comparisons between—or even within—jurisdictions, gang-related data are exceptionally 
unreliable for this purpose” (p. 60). The national estimates of gang prevalence published 
by NYGC are less volatile because they combine results from hundreds of jurisdictions. 
Nonetheless, trends in estimated city and county gang membership reversed directions 
three times between 1996 and 2002 (Egley, Howell, and Major 2006). Despite these 
flaws, NYGS data do provide a general picture of the scope and direction of the gang 
problem, as it is perceived by law enforcement. The most recent NYGC report indicates 
that the U.S. had roughly 24,000 youth gangs and 760,000 gang members in 2004 (Egley 
& Ritz, 2006). The numbers are daunting, immediately conjuring images of a marauding 
army of gun toting criminals half the size of the active U.S. military. But NYGC data 
indicate that the size and reach of gangs have actually declined over the past decade. The 
estimated gang population is down from roughly 850,000 in 1996, and the proportion of 
jurisdictions reporting gang problems has fallen sharply (Greene and Pranis, 2007, pp. 
33-36).
The number of jurisdictions reporting gang problems fell sharply at the end of the 
1990s. The largest reductions have occurred in rural counties, where the proportion of 
law enforcement respondents reporting gang problems has fallen by nearly half since the 
late 1990s. One in eight rural law enforcement agencies (12.3 percent) reported gang
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problems between 2002 and 2004, while a quarter (24.3 percent) reported problems 
between 1996 and 1998.
The 1995 NYGS conducted by the NYGC, is the first of decade-long annual 
survey that will allow comparisons of changes and trends n coming years. The results of 
this survey confirm what earlier studies had suggested—there has been a growth in the 
pervasiveness of the nation’s youth gang problem over time. NYGC contacted more than
4,000 agencies—the largest number ever surveyed, according to the National Gang 
Center. “The reports and estimates from responding agencies indicate that there were 
more than 660,000 youth gang members and more than 23,000 gangs active in their 
jurisdictions during 1995. Although these are the largest totals reported to date, the actual 
numbers are likely to be higher” (Gangs, August 1997, p. 1). Not all law enforcement 
agencies were surveyed, some of those surveyed did not participate, and the data were not 
extrapolated. The purpose of the 1995 NYG survey was to provide broader baseline data 
on the current youth gang situation, fill some informational gaps, and establish a network 
of reporting agencies for future data collection. It was intended, among other things, to 
build upon cumulative data collected by Dr. Walter Miller, a gang researcher (Bilchik, 
1997).
Over nearly 25 years, Miller had collected information about youth gang activity 
in communities across the country from many sources. NYGC staff worked with Dr. 
Miller to supplement his data base by adding several hundred cities and towns that had 
reported youth gang activity in recent surveys, including those conducted by David Curry 
et aL the National Drug Intelligence Center, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms, and other studies whose distribution is restricted. Miller prepared a set of lists
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for NYGC that identified 6,264 localities and categorized them as: (1) city or county, (2) 
previously reporting a gang problem or no gang problem reported, and (3) members or 
nonmembers of the Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) projects (Bilchik,
1997, pp. 5-20).
From these communities, NYGC staff selected 4,120 localities (2,820 cities and 
1,300 counties) to be included in the 1995 survey: 1,877 agencies that had reported 
having a youth gang problem at some time over the past 25 years, and 2,243 that had not 
previously reported gangs or that had never been surveyed (Bilchik, 1997, pp. 5-10). 
Although selection of the 1995 survey localities was not random, the inclusion of 
localities previously identified by Curry et al. in 1994 added an element of randomness 
(Curry et al., 1996). The 1994 researchers surveyed all cities with populations between
150,000 and 200,000 and a random sample of 284 of the 1,126 municipalities with 
populations ranging from 25,000 to 150,000 (Ibid, pp. 8-11).
NYGC staff next identified the law enforcement agencies serving the 4,120 
counties, cities, and towns. A useful survey technique is to triangulate data in a 
community by questioning several agencies with diverse perspectives on the problem 
being surveyed. Triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the 
investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing 
findings. Since much social research is founded on the use of a single research method 
and as such may suffer from limitations associated with that method or from the specific 
application of it, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced confidence. Triangulation 
is one of the several rationales for multi-method research. The term derives from 
surveying, where it refers to the use of a series of triangles to map out an area. However,
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to keep costs as low as possible for the first NYG survey, inquiries were made to law 
enforcement agencies only. The survey goal was to involve the largest number of 
agencies to date, and efficiency and cost were factors (Webb et al., 1966, p. 10).
Law enforcement agencies appear to have become the youth gang survey 
respondents of choice, particularly in recent years. A final reason for using law 
enforcement agencies as sources was the close working relationship between 
Intergovernmental Research (IIR), which operates NYGC, and the six RISS projects, 
which nclude in their membership more than 4,600 local, state, and Federal law 
enforcement agencies. It was believed that support by the RISS projects would facilitate 
and add credibility to the survey. Membership lists maintained by each RISS project were 
screened, and state and Federal agencies were deleted. The sample of 4,120 law 
enforcement agencies ultimately selected for the 1995 survey included 3,230 police and 
sheriffs departments that were RISS members (Bilchik, 1997, pp. 8-12).
In November and December 1995, NYGC staff constructed an administrative 
database in preparation for the survey mail out and processing. Using various law 
enforcement directories and information supplied by the RISS projects, staff created a 
record for each of the agencies to be surveyed. Each record contained the agency’s Chief 
Executive Officer’s or other senior official’s name, mailing address, telephone and 
facsimile numbers, and fields for tracking dispatch, follow-up actions, and return of the 
survey instruments. Additional data fields indicate RISS project affiliation and whether or 
not gang problems had been reported previously. A separate database containing U.S. 
Census Bureau information was obtained and linked to the administrative database. The 
1990 census and the latest population estimate for the city or county were linked to the
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record of each law enforcement agency reporting. (Because they were asked to report on
the unincorporated areas of their jurisdictions only, the census figures for the
unincorporated areas were tied to reports from sheriffs departments.) At the same time
that the agencies to be surveyed were being indexed, the survey questions and
instruments were being developed and refined (Miller, 2001).
Early in planning for the 1995 survey, NYGC decided to automate the process as
much as possible. Accordingly, the survey forms were designed using a software program
that allowed responses to be returned by mail or by facsimile, whereupon the responses
would be entered directly nto an electronic database without generating paper copies.
Two survey instruments were designed: one for agencies that had previously reported
youth gang activity the other for agencies for which no previous report of gang problems
was known to NYGC. Page one of each form contained the following instructions:
Please report only for the jurisdiction served by your agency. Sheriffs 
departments should report only for their unincorporated service area and any 
contracted communities. Separate database containing U.S. Census Bureau 
information was obtained and linked to the administrative database. This was 
intended to prevent duplicative reporting by law enforcement agencies in the 
same county (Bilchik, 1995, pp. 8-12).
Instruction number two was an attempt to deal with definitional problems that have
divided researchers and practitioners for years. For the purposes of this survey, a “Youth
Gang” is defined as a group of youths in your jurisdiction, aged approximately 10 to 22,
that you or other responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify
or classify as a ‘gang.’ Do not include motorcycle gangs, hate or ideology groups, prison
gangs, or adult gangs (Curry et al., 1996). Curry has described well the various
definitions of “gang” that have been used by researchers in many national surveys.
Further compounding the problem is the development of other definitions used by law
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enforcement agencies to test and measure the criminal activity of gangs. The NYGC 
definition used in the 1995 survey was developed with the assistance of Walter Miller 
and other researchers, and although it represents consensus among those who drafted it, 
others may find it does not meet their needs (Miller, 2001). The upper age limit of the 
definition (21 years) was established by OJJDP’s enabling legislation. The final 
instruction stated:
This survey form was designed to be faxed to the National Youth Gang Center at 
[telephone number], where it will automatically be entered into a survey database. 
If you do not have a fax, or prefer to return the completed form by mail, please use 
the preaddressed envelope. If that envelope has been misplaced, please mail the 
survey to: [NYGC address] (Bilchik, 1997, p. 6).
A letter transmitting the survey forms to the law enforcement agencies was prepared in
two versions. For agencies that were members of one of the six RISS projects, the letter
was sent to the individual with whom the RISS project routinely exchanged law
enforcement intelligence. For agencies that were not RISS members, the forms were sent
to the police chief or sheriff. In both cases, the cover letter repeated the instructions
referred to above and requested that if the addressee turned the survey form over to
someone else to complete, that individual must be knowledgeable and be authorized to
reply on behalf of the agency (Bilchik, 1997).
Between December 21, 1995, and January 2, 1996, 4,120 surveys were mailed to
2,820 police departments and 1,300 sheriffs departments. Approximately 50 percent of
the survey forms were returned by January 31, 1996; one-half by fax and one-half by
mail. Follow-up telephone calls to the agencies that did not respond to the mailed survey
were then initiated, which increased the response rate considerably. Following the calls, a
total of 3,440 surveys had been returned (or 83 percent of the target group); police
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departments and 29.5 percent furnished 70.5 percent of these responses by sheriffs 
departments. (The rate of survey return by police departments was 86 percent and 78 
percent by sheriffs.) The valuable assistance of the RISS projects in administering the 
survey is evident in the return rates: 87 percent by law enforcement agencies that were 
RISS members, and 72 percent by non-RISS agencies (Bilchik, 1997, pp. 6-10).
Reports were analyzed by Uniform Crime Report (UCR) regional groupings. The 
area with the highest number of agencies reporting gang activity was the West, followed 
by the Midwest, South, and Northeast. A total of 1,433 respondents (931 police and 502 
sheriffs departments) reported no youth gang activity in 1995. The largest number of 
agencies reporting no activity was in the Midwest, followed by the South, West, and 
Northeast. Respondents who reported no youth gang activity were asked to rate the 
likelihood of youth gang problems developing in their jurisdictions i n the near future on a 
scale from “high” (meaning a high likelihood) to “none” (meaning no likelihood of future 
problems). Ninety-six percent (1,379) of the respondents reporting “no gangs” provided 
likelihood ratings as follows: 7 percent (102) thought there was a “high” likelihood of 
future youth gang problems; 30 percent (409) believed there was a “medium” likelihood; 
55 percent (752) rated the likelihood “low”; and only 8 percent (116) ruled out future 
youth gang activity altogether (Bilchik, 1997).
Respondents were asked to report from their records or, in the absence of records, 
to estimate how many youth gangs were active in their localities in 1995. About 13 
percent of the respondents who reported youth gang problems did not report how many 
youth gangs were active in their locality. Of the 2,007 agencies reporting gang problems 
in 1995, 1,741 reported or estimated numbers totaling 23,388 youth gangs in their
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jurisdictions. Previous surveys estimated national totals by directly surveying selected 
major cities and extrapolating data obtained from a sampling of smaller cities. The 
estimated number of gangs from these earlier projections for the entire country was less 
than this survey’s actual reports from 1,741 communities. For the purpose of analysis, the 
number of youth gangs per reporting jurisdiction was categorized as “1-9 gangs,” “10-19 
gangs,” “20-29 gangs,” and “30 or more.” Of the respondents who could report or 
estimate the number of gangs, about 73 percent (971) of city departments and 65 percent 
(272) of county agencies said they had fewer than 10 active youth gangs per reporting 
locality (Bilchik, 1997).
The data below highlights findings from the five NYGS conducted annually since 
the above 1995 survey by the NYGC. The nationally representative sample of 3,018 law 
enforcement agencies includes (1) all police and sheriffs departments serving suburban 
counties and cities with populations of more than 25,000 and (2) a randomly selected 
sample of police and sheriffs departments serving rural counties and cities with 
populations between 2,500 and 25,000. Again the survey respondents were asked to 
consider the same definition for youth gangs and report information only for youth gangs, 
defined as “a group of youths or young adults in your jurisdiction that you or other 
responsible persons in your agency or community are willing to identify or classify as a 
‘gang.’” For all the data collected from 1995-2010, all motorcycle gangs, hate or 
ideology groups, prison gangs, and adult gangs were excluded from the surveys. Annual 
response rates ranged from 84 to 92 percent during the survey years of 1996 to 2000 
(Bilchik, 1997, pp. 10-16).
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The proportion of respondents that reported youth gangs in their jurisdiction 
decreased over the survey years, from 53 percent in 1996 to 40 percent in 2000. Between 
1996 and 2000, NYGC researchers observed three patterns: persistent, transitory, and a 
total absence of gang activity. In cities with a population of more than 250,000, all 
respondents reported persistent gang activity from 1996 to 2000. Eighty-six percent of 
cities with a population between 100,000 and 250,000 and 61 percent of cities with a 
population between 50,000 and 100,000 reported persistent gang activity over the survey 
years, whereas only 6 percent and 9 percent, respectively, reported a total absence of 
gang activity. In cities with a population between 25,000 and 50,000, 38 percent of 
respondents reported persistent gang activity, 41 percent reported transitory gang activity, 
and 21 percent reported a total absence of gang activity (Egley, 2002).
In suburban counties with a population of more than 100,000, 61 percent of 
respondents reported persistent gang activity and 9 percent reported a total absence of 
gang-activity from 1996 to 2000. Law enforcement agencies serving smaller cities (i.e., 
with a population of less than 25,000) and rural counties were less likely to report 
persistent gang activity during the survey years. In smaller cities, 13 percent of 
respondents reported persistent gang activity and 48 percent reported a total absence of 
gang activity. Rural counties reported 7 percent and 60 percent, respectively (Egley,
2002, p. 1).
NYGC researchers estimate that more than 24,500 gangs were active in the 
United States in 2000, a decline of 5 percent from 1999. However, cities with a 
population of more than 25,000 experienced a slight increase (up 1 percent from 1999) in 
the number of gangs. The estimated 12,850 gangs in these cities equal the 1996 estimate,
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the largest number reported during the survey years. The overall estimate of gang 
members across the U.S. has exceeded 750,000 in all survey years. NYGC researchers 
estimate that more than 772,500 gang members were active in the United States in 2000, 
a decline of 8 percent from 1999. Nevertheless, cities with a population of more than
25.000, which accounted for 66 percent of all gang members in 2000, experienced an 
increase (up 2 percent from 1999) in the number of gang members (Egley et al., 2006).
The estimated 509,500 gang members in these cities were the most reported since 
1996. A total of 284 cities with both a population of more than 25,000 and persistent 
gang activity reported gang homicide statistics for 1999 and 2000. Ninety-one percent of 
cities with a population of more than 250,000 reported at least one gang-related homicide 
from 1999 to 2000, as did 64 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and
250.000, 55 percent of cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000, and 32 
percent of cities with a population between 25,000 and 50,000. Among those cities with 
one or more gang homicides, 47 percent reported an increase and 42 percent reported a 
decrease in the number of gang homicides from 1999 to 2000 (Egley, 2002).
Analysis of the National Youth Gang Surveys from 1996 to 2000 indicates that 
the Nation’s youth gang problem continues to affect a large number of jurisdictions and 
has been most persistent in the largest cities. All cities with a population of more than
250,000 and 86 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and 250,000 reported 
persistent gang activity from 1996 to 2000, and the prevalence of gang-related homicides 
was highest in cities of these sizes. Additionally, the estimated number of gangs and gang 
members in larger cities (i.e., with a population of more than 25,000) has remained
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virtually unchanged, counter to the overall decline of gangs and gang members over the 
survey years (Egley, 2002, p. 2).
The 2000 NYGS is the sixth annual gang survey conducted since 1995 by the 
NYGC. The 2000 survey used the same sample as the surveys conducted from 1996 
through 1999, which consisted of the following: A total of 1,216 police departments 
serving all larger cities (with populations of 25,000 or more), a total of 661 suburban 
county police and sheriffs departments (all suburban counties), a randomly selected 
sample (n = 398) of police departments serving cities with populations between 2,500 and 
24,999 smaller cities, and a randomly selected sample (n = 743) of rural county police 
and sheriff s departments (rural counties).
Results from the 2000 NYGS indicate that the characteristics of gang-related 
violent crime varied according to jurisdictional size. More than half of the larger areas 
reported that the majority of their gang-related violent crime was committed against 
members of other gangs, whereas more than half of the smaller areas reported that the 
majority of their gang-related violent crime was committed against ndivi duals not 
involved in gangs. More than half of all agencies reported that individual members acting 
alone or with a few other gang members committed the majority of the gang-related 
violent crime, and gang members returning from prison were reported to have affected 
local gang problems in a large number of areas. These findings highlight the importance 
of continuing systematic assessment and response in combating youth gang problems 
(Egley et al., 2006).
In 2001, of 3,018 survey recipients, 2,560 (85 percent) responded to the 2001 
survey. All cities with a population of 250,000 or more reported gang activity in 2001, as
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did 85 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and 249,999; 65 percent of 
cities with a population between 50,000 and 99,999; 44 percent of cities with a 
population between 25,000 and 49,999; and 20 percent of cities with a population 
between 2,500 and 24,999. Thirty-five percent of suburban counties and 11 percent of 
rural counties reported gang activity in 2001. Additionally, 95 percent of the jurisdictions 
reporting gang activity in 2001 also reported gang activity in previous survey years. 
Based on survey results, it is estimated that nearly 3,000 jurisdictions across the U.S. 
experienced gang activity in 2001 (Egley et al., 2006).
Available data for gang-problem cities with a population of 25,000 or more show 
that 42 percent reported an increase in the number of gang members, and 45 percent 
reported an increase in the number of gangs from the previous two survey years. The 
largest gang-problem cities (i.e., those with a population of 100,000 or more) have 
consistently reported greater numbers of gang members over the years the survey has 
been conducted. A majority (56 percent) of these cities reported either an increase or no 
significant change in the number of gang members in 2001. Since the emergence of the 
youth gang survey this fact has been consistent that the greatest proportion of youth gang 
activity has been found in large cities.
A significant number of gang-problem cities across the U.S. reported gang-related 
homicides in 2001, including 69 percent of those with a population of 100,000 or more 
and 37 percent of those with a population between 50,000 and 99,999. More than half of 
all homicides in Los Angeles and Chicago were reported to be gang related in 2001 (59 
percent and 53 percent, respectively). The total number of gang-related homicides (698) 
in these two cities alone was greater than the total number of gang-related homicides
52
(637) reported by 130 other gang-problem cities with a population of 100,000 or more 
(Egley et al., 2006).
Sixty-three percent of gang-problem jurisdictions reported the return of gang 
members from confinement to their jurisdiction in 2001. More than two-thirds (69 
percent) of these jurisdictions reported that gang members returning from confinement 
considerably affected their jurisdictions’ gang problem in 2001. A large proportion of 
these jurisdictions reported that returning members noticeably contributed to an increase 
in violent crime (63 percent of respondents) and drug trafficking (68 percent) by local 
gangs. Additionally, more than one-third (34 percent) of these jurisdictions reported the 
absence of community programs to assist members returning from confinement, and 35 
percent could not provide information regarding these types of programs (Egley et al., 
2006).
In 2002, almost 1000 less respondents were surveyed causing the lowest return of 
survey recipients to date. Of the 2,563 survey recipients, 2,182 (85 percent) responded to 
the 2002 survey. All cities with a population of 250,000 or more reported youth gang 
problems in 2002, as did 87 percent of cities with a population between 100,000 and 
249,999. Thirty-eight percent of responding suburban county agencies, 27 percent of 
responding smaller city agencies, and 12 percent of responding rural county agencies also 
reported youth gang problems in 2002. In general, smaller city agencies outnumber larger 
city agencies 10 to 1, and rural county agencies outnumber suburban county agencies 3 to 
1. Therefore, the steady decline of reported gang problems over the initial survey years is 
most notable for smaller cities and rural counties. The figure shows the percentage of law 
enforcement agencies, by agency type, that reported youth gang problems from 1996 to
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2002. Based on survey results, it is estimated that, in 2002, youth gangs were active in 
more than 2,300 cities with a population of 2,500 or more and n more than 550 
jurisdictions served by county law enforcement agencies. These results are comparable to 
those from recent NYGC surveys and provide preliminary evidence that the overall 
number of jurisdictions experiencing gang problems in a given year may be stabilizing 
(Egley et al., 2004, pp. 103-106).
According to Egley et al. (2004) it is estimated that approximately 731,500 gang 
members and 21,500 gangs were active in the U.S. in 2002. The estimated number of 
gang members between 1996 and 2002 decreased 14 percent and the estimated number of 
jurisdictions experiencing gang problems decreased 32 percent (p. 105). This difference 
is largely a result of the decline in reported gang problems by smaller cities and rural 
counties that have also reported comparatively fewer gang members over survey years. 
Larger cities and suburban counties accounted for approximately 85 percent of the 
estimated number of gang members in 2002.
A total of 142 cities with a population of 100,000 or more reported both a gang 
problem and gang homicide data (i.e., the number of homicides involving a gang 
member) in 2002. Of these cities, 51 reported no gang-related homicides. Of the 
remaining 91 cities that reported 1 or more gang-related homicides, 89 reported a total of 
577 gang-related homicides and 2 (Chicago and Los Angeles) reported a total of 655 
gang-related homicides. When compared with the more than 1,300 total homicides 
recorded in Chicago and Los Angeles in 2002, these findings suggest that approximately 
half of the homicides in these two cities were gang related in that year (Egley et al.,
2004). Forty-two percent of respondents indicated their youth gang problem was “getting
54
worse” in 2002 compared with 2001 and 16 percent indicated it was “getting better.” In 
the 2001 survey, these statistics were 27 percent and 20 percent, respectively, indicating 
an appreciable increase in the proportion of respondents who regarded their gang problem 
as worsening.
The NYGS was not ndependently done for the year of 2003 so this is a two-year 
comparison of the results from the above 2002 and 2003 youth gang survey. Of the 2,405 
survey recipients, 2,275 (95 percent) responded to the 2002 and/or 2003 survey (1,524 
responded in both survey years), and the remaining 130 (5 percent) did not respond in 
either survey year. All responding agencies serving cities in the largest population group 
reported youth gang problems in the study period, as did a large majority of agencies in 
the next largest population group. Gang problems were least likely to be reported in cities 
in the smallest population group and, especially, in rural counties.
Most notably, agencies serving cities in the largest population group reported 
numbers very different from those of all other areas: approximately 6 out of 10 reported 
more than 30 gangs in their jurisdiction, and an equal percentage reported more than
1,000 gang members. In contrast, a majority of agencies serving rural counties and cities 
in the smallest population group reported three or fewer gangs and 50 or fewer gang 
members. Agencies in suburban counties reported substantial variation in these numbers; 
in addition, more than one-third did not provide estimates of the number of gang 
members in. their jurisdiction (Egley, 2005).
Consistent with the previous 8-year survey results, more than one-third of the 
agencies serving cities in the largest population group reported an annual maximum of 10 
or more gang-related homicides. Relatively few agencies serving rural counties and the
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cities in the smallest population group reported a gang-related homicide in the study 
period (2001 being an outlier year attributed to survey methods). Overall, these findings 
provide evidence that, in large part, gangs, gang members, and gang-related homicides 
are predominantly concentrated in larger cities.
Of the 2,554 survey recipients, 2,296 (90 percent) responded to the 2004 survey. 
NYGC estimates that 29 percent of the jurisdictions that city (population of 2,500 or 
more) and county law enforcement agencies serve experienced youth gang problems in 
2004. Within area type, 82 percent of the agencies that serve larger cities, 42 percent of 
the agencies that serve suburban counties, 27 percent of the agencies that serve smaller 
cities, and 14 percent of the agencies that serve rural counties reported youth gang 
problems (Egley, 2005).
The average percentage of agencies that reported gang problems declined across 
all area types between the 1996-1998 and 1999-2001 survey periods. Compared with the 
1999-2001 survey period, in the 2002-2004 survey period the average percentage of 
agencies that reported gang problems was slightly higher in smaller and larger cities, 
slightly lower in rural counties, and virtually unchanged in suburban counties. Based on 
survey results, NYGC estimates that approximately 760,000 gang members and 24,000 
gangs were active in more than 2,900 jurisdictions that city (population of 2,500 or more) 
and county law enforcement agencies served in 2004 (Egley, 2005). These estimates, 
although slightly higher than those in the previous two NYGC surveys, are not 
statistically large enough to indicate a significant change at the national level. A nearly 
equal percentage of agencies with gang problems reported an increase (52 percent) versus 
a decrease or no significant change (48 percent) in the number of documented gang
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members in 2004 compared with the 2002-2003 survey period. Larger cities and 
suburban counties accounted for approximately 85 percent of the estimated number of 
gang members in 2004.
For the first time, the 2004 survey asked about migration of gang members, or the 
movement of actively involved gang youth from other jurisdictions. Ten percent of 
responding agencies reported that more than half of the documented gang members in 
their jurisdiction had migrated from other areas; however, a majority (60 percent) of 
respondents reported no or few (less than 25 percent of documented gang members) such 
migrants. Among agencies that experienced a higher percentage of migration, 45 percent 
reported that social reasons (e.g., members moving with families, pursuit of legitimate 
employment opportunities) affected local migration patterns “very much.” Drug market 
opportunities (23 percent), avoidance of law enforcement crackdowns (21 percent), and 
participation n other illegal ventures (18 percent) were reported as reasons for migration 
to a lesser degree. Agencies that experienced the highest levels of gang-member 
migration were significantly more likely to report migration for social reasons (Egley,
2005).
A total of 173 cities with a population of 100,000 or more reported a gang 
problem and gang homicide data (i.e., the number of homicides involving a gang 
member) in 2004. In two cities, Los Angeles and Chicago, more than half of the 
combined nearly 1,000 homicides were considered to be gang related. In the remaining 
171 cities, approximately one-fourth of all the homicides were considered to be gang 
related. In addition, the number of gang homicides recorded in these cities in 2004 was
11 percent higher than the previous 8-year average. More than 80 percent of agencies
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with gang problems in both smaller cities and rural counties recorded zero gang 
homicides (Egley, 2005).
Thirty-six percent of the responding agencies that experienced gang problems in 
2004, including 51 percent of larger cities, operated a specialized unit with at least two 
officers who were primarily assigned to handle matters related to youth gangs. Fifty-three 
percent of the responding agencies indicated their youth gang problem was “getting 
better” or “staying about the same” in 2004 as compared with 2003, and 47 percent said it 
was “getting worse,” an ncrease of 5 percentage points over the previous year. Little 
variation in these numbers was observed across agency types (Egley, 2005).
Of the 2,551 survey recipients, 1,798 (70 percent) responded to the 2005 survey. 
Within area type, 83 percent of agencies that serve larger cities, 50 percent of agencies 
that serve suburban counties, 33 percent of agencies that serve smaller cities, and 17 
percent of agencies that serve rural counties reported youth gang problems in 2005. The 
2005 study shows the percentage of law enforcement agencies, by agency type, that 
reported youth gang problems over the 10-year period from 1996 to 2005. A number of 
observations are immediately evident in 2005. First, the percentage of agencies in larger 
cities reporting gang problems is significantly higher than all other area types, and is 
followed, in order, by suburban counties, smaller cities, and rural counties. Second, the 
10-year trend in prevalence rates of gang problems is remarkably similar across all area 
types, albeit at different levels. Briefly stated, the percentage of law enforcement 
agencies reporting gang problems across all areas was highest in the mid-1990s, 
continued to decline until reaching a low in 2001, and has since begun to trend back 
upward with 2005 figures most closely resembling 1999 rates (Egley et al., 2006).
58
Based on survey results, NYGC estimates that gangs were active in more than 
3,400 jurisdictions served by city (population of 2,500 or more) and county law 
enforcement agencies in 2005. This estimate represents a statistically significant increase 
over the observed 10-year low in 2001. The upward trend of agencies reporting gang 
problems in recent years also corresponds to notable increases n the estimated number of 
gangs and gang members in the U.S., which, in 2005, were 26,000 and 790,000, 
respectively. Echoing the upward trend in the percentage of agencies reporting gang 
problems in recent years, the 2005 survey year marks the first year in the 2000s in which 
the estimate of gang membership size is above the 10-year average. This change in trend 
in 2005, underscored by the statistically significant ncrease over the 10-year low in 
2001, is one to closely monitor in upcoming surveys (Egley et al., 2006).
Here lies the premise for why youth gang initiatives have begun to lose their 
traction amongst national trends and call for a new strategic action plan. A primary 
concern for communities is violent criminal activity by gangs, in particular lethal forms 
of violence generally classified as “gang-related homicides” (i.e., homicides involving a 
gang member as either the perpetrator and/or victim). Overall, larger cities accounted for 
nearly 77 percent of the recorded gang homicides across the country. However, suburban 
counties reported an additional 20 percent, while the remai ning two area types accounted 
for the remainder, or approximately 3 percent. In addition to particular survey items that 
measure specific aspects of an agency’s gang problem (e.g., documented number of 
gangs and gang members), NYGS also annually requests each agency to provide an 
overall general assessment of the current gang problem in their jurisdiction compared to 
previous years. A slight majority (53 percent) of agencies that reported a gang problem
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also assessed their gang problem as “getting worse” in 2005 compared to 2004. The 
remainder reported their gang problem as “staying about the same” (37 percent) or 
“getting better” (9 percent). These figures varied very little within area types (Egley et 
al., 2006).
Taken as a whole, the results of the 2005 NYGS continue to emphasize the 
expansiveness and seriousness of the gang problem across the United States. Following a 
marked decline throughout the late-1990s, gang-prevalence rates, as well as estimated 
total gang membership size, have trended upward in recent years, representing 
statistically significant increases over 10-year lows n 2001. These findings are 
suggestive of a resurgence of gang activity on a national level.
After examining a decade of National Youth Gang Surveys the provided data 
must be taken with this caveat, the mental gymnastics required to square law enforcement 
gang estimates with youth survey data are convoluted, forcing us to carefully consider the 
possibility that the law enforcement estimates are simply wrong. There are much simpler 
explanations for why law enforcement would tend to underestimate White gang 
populations and overestimate nonwhite gang populations
First, suburban, small-town, and rural law enforcement agencies may be less 
capable of detecting and tracking gang activity than urban police agencies. Small-town 
officers may not recognize gang activity, and small-town police departments may find t 
more difficult to establish and maintain gang databases. These factors could contribute to 
the undercount of white gang members, who are more likely to live in majority white 
suburbs and towns than are nonwhite gang members. Second, the practices employed by 
urban law enforcement agencies to identify and track gang members may contribute to
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the nonwhite over-count. Gang databases are notoriously unreliable because there are 
often too few controls on who is put in them and also because too little effort goes into 
removing people who are no longer active gang members from the database (Egley, 
Howell, & Major, 2006).
NYGC staff cites the second problem as one reason for the apparent aging of the 
youth gang population (Egley, Howell, & Major 2006). Jurisdictions that began tracking 
gang members at a given point keep people in their files long after they have ceased 
“banging,” creating the false impression that the membership is steadily aging and 
growing. Egley also observes that law enforcement agencies have an nstitutional bias 
toward identifying older individuals as the source of gang problems: “The longer they 
have the problem ...the more police start focusing on the older members, thinking that it’s 
going to solve the gang problem” (Greene & Pranis, 2007, p. 43).
Third, there is ample evidence that police misidentify minority youth as gang 
members based on their race and ethnicity, style of dress, and association with gang 
peers. Siegel (2003) notes that, according to a report prepared by the Los Angeles district 
attorney’s office, “46.8 percent of the African American men between the ages of twenty- 
one and twenty-four in L. A. County have been entered into the police gang-tracking 
database” (p. 10). Siegel also cites a 1993 New York Times report that “two of three 
young black men in Denver were on a gang suspect list.” As an NAACP official put it at 
the time: “They ought to call it a blacklist. ... It’s not a crackdown on gangs; it’s a 
crackdown on blacks” (Siegel, 2003, p. 11). After considering the extensive list of 
reasons the OJJDP NYGS results can be skewed varying every year we must also 
understand why the information is valuable. Among one of the main reasons is
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consistency of the same polling data to be asked and evaluated by the same 
administration agencies. Furthermore, the numbers though a bit varying were extremely 
consistent considering polling was voluntarily done by cooperating police departments. 
Finally, the results are examined for a decade in a row and to see the changes in youth 
gang data cannot be found elsewhere for the same amount of time. Using this many years 
and the most recent poll below conducted in 2012 gives the best impression of 
nationwide trends and changes in youth gang trends.
The most recent poll was conducted in 2012 where gangs were active in slightly 
less than 30 percent of the responding jurisdictions. This estimate has declined slightly 
over the past 4 consecutive years and is at the lowest point in nearly a decade. The 
decline from 2011 to 2012 can be almost solely attributed to the drop in smaller cities, 
where gang prevalence has decreased nearly 10 percentage points since 2010. Across 
jurisdiction types, prevalence rates of gang activity followed a marked decline in the late 
1990s, increased in the early 2000s, and, with the exception of smaller cities, have 
generally stabilized in recent years (Egley et al., 2013).
Approximately 85 percent of larger cities, 50 percent of suburban counties, and 15 
percent of rural counties have reported gang activity in each of the past four surv eys. The 
greatest change in recent years has occurred in smaller cities, where the percentage of 
agencies reporting gang activity has significantly declined—approximately 25 percent 
reported gang activity in 2012, down from 34 percent in 2010. This is the lowest rate 
recorded in more than a decade (Egley et al., 2013).
The increase in the estimated number of gangs (8 percent) and gang members (11 
percent) is primarily attributable to increased estimates that larger cities reported. For
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example, more than 50 percent of the net increase in the estimated number of gang 
members n 2012 occurred in areas with larger populations. Along with the declining 
prevalence rates of gang activity in smaller cities (and the historically low rates in rural 
counties), these results suggest that gang activity is becoming even more concentrated in 
urban areas. These findings do not support the popularly held notion that gang activity is 
spreading outward to less densely populated areas.
In terms of gang-related crime, law enforcement agencies report that they do not 
regularly record offenses as “gang related,” with the exception of homicides. Thus, the 
NYGS can only report findings related to this one criminal offense type. Respondents 
reported a total of 2,363 gang-related homicides in the U.S. in 2012. The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports estimates that there were more than 14,800 
homicides nationally in 2012. Taken together, these findings suggest that gangs were 
involved in approximately 16 percent of all homicides n the United States in 2012 and 
underscore the considerable overlap between gang activity and violent crime (Egley et 
al., 2013).
Compared with the previous 5-year average, the number of gang-related 
homicides that NYGS respondents reported increased by more than 20 percent in 2012. 
This increase is due to higher counts of reported gang homicides in certain larger cities in 
the NYGS sample and also to NYGS respondents reporting more completely compared 
with previous years (i.e., the increase in 2012 is partly an artifact of agencies reporting 
more complete data). Fifty-five percent of the responding agencies characterized their 
gang problems as “staying about the same” in 2012, an increase over the percentage of 
agencies in 2010 and 2011 and the largest percentage that the survey has ever recorded.
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Understanding law enforcement practices and procedures for designating 
individuals as gang members provides insight into the type and range of data maintained. 
The 2012 NYGS asked respondents to characterize the frequency of use of six common 
practices for designating an individual as a gang member. The percentage of agencies 
reporting the use of a practice as “very often” is as follows, in descending order: displays 
gang symbols (66 percent of respondents), has been arrested or associates with known 
gang members (56 percent), self-nomination in a custodial setting (54 percent), self­
nomination in a noncustodial setting (49 percent), designated by another law enforcement 
agency (42 percent), and identified by a reliable informant (25 percent). The frequency of 
use of self-nomination is notable, since many states permit this technique to be used as a 
sole indicator (Egley et al., 2013).
The staggering figures below reveal after over 20 years of youth gang initiative 
and evaluating four different youth gang initiatives, the OJJDP, G R E A T . ,  D.A.R.E., 
and Operation Ceasefire, the prevalence of gang problems is again on the rise. In 
G.R.E.A.T. Esbensen and Osgood in 1999 conducted a 1-year survey and another to 
verify the results in 2001. The study used cross-sectional and longitudinal design and to 
recap, the multi-component evaluation found that the G.R.E.A.T. program is 
implemented as it is intended and has the intended program effects on youth gang 
membership and on a number of risk factors and social skills thought to be associated 
with gang membership. Results 1 year post-program showed a 39 percent reduction in 
odds of gang-joining among students who received the program compared to those who 
did not and an average of 24 percent reduction in odds of gang joining across the 4 years 
post-program. However, in 2006, the University of Missouri-St. Louis was awarded a
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grant from the National Institute of Justice to determine what effect, if any, the 
G.R.E.A.T. program had on students. To assess program effectiveness, they mounted a 
multi-strategy research design that included the following components: 1) assessment of 
G.R.E.A.T. officer training; 2) surveying of a) officers teaching the program and b) 
teachers and school administrators in whose classrooms and schools the program was 
delivered; 3) observation of more than 500 classroom sessions; and 4) a randomized 
control trial involving 3,820 students nested in 195 classrooms in 31 schools in 7 cities. 
These students were surveyed six times in the course of 5 years thereby allowing 
assessment of both short- and long-term program effects. The results showed the 
G.R.E.A.T. program to be implemented well nationwide but not yielding the desired 
outcome of reduction of gang involvement. In fact, G.R.E.A.T. has proven to show little 
deduction in the way of juvenile delinquency at all (Esbensen & Peterson and Taylor,
2012, pp. 125-130).
Braga and Pierce (2005) found that the Ceasefire intervention made a large impact 
on the yearly percentage of traceable handguns that were new with a fast time-to-crime 
(which is the time between a firearm’s first sale at retail and subsequent recovery in a 
crime) recovered by the Boston (Mass.) Police Department. Simple pre/post comparisons 
showed that the percentage of traced handguns with a fast time-to-crime increased 
steadily between 1991 and 1996, reaching a peak of 53.8 percent of traced handguns in 
1996. Then between 1997 and 1999, the percentage of traced handguns with a fast time- 
to-crime decreased dramatically to 15.6 percent and remained at this lower level through
2003. Counting 1997 as the first full year of gun market intervention, there was a 47 
percent reduction in the percentage of new traced handguns in Boston, from an average
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of 40.4 percent between 1991 and 1996 to an average of 21.4 percent between 1997 and
2003.
Multivariate analysis (which controlled for other predictor variables) of new 
handguns recovered in Boston found that Operation Ceasefire was associated with a 
statistically significant reduction in the percentage of recovered handguns that had a fast 
time-to-crime. Ceasefire was associated with a 22.7 percent reduction in the average 
monthly percentage of all recovered handguns that were new and a 24.3 percent reduction 
in the average monthly percentage of all recovered youth handguns that were new, as 
well as with a 29.7 percent reduction in the average monthly percentage of illegal 
possession handguns that were new and a 17.4 percent reduction in the average monthly 
percentage of all recovered substantive crime handguns that were new, all reductions 
were statistically significant (Braga & Pierce, 2005). However, in the 20 years following 
the Boston Gun Project almost 60 cities have participated n Operation Ceasefire with a 
staggering 1 percent having a 10 percent or better reduction for more than one year after 
the project has been funded. It is evident that Boston’s results will not be duplicated 
(Braga & Pierce, 2005). Moreover, Operation Sunny Day in East Palo Alto resulted in the 
loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars that could have been generated to create other 
funded initiatives. It is the goal of this thesis to prove that through using the proper 
delinquency prevention strategies and placing federal and local funding in the proper 
channels we can again drop youth gang participation to the all time lows of 2000 as seen 
in the OJJDP survey. Moreover, it is through demographic specific strategies as the one 
proposed here in Lowndes County that will better assimilate different agencies to one
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goal of educating youth, providing futures, and growing the community in ways no other 
program can provide.
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Chapter V 
DISCUSSION
Project Design
During the late 19th and throughout the 20th century, strategies of inquiry 
associated with quantitative research were those that involved the post-positivist 
worldview and that originated mainly in psychology. These include true experiments and 
less rigorous experiments call quasi-experiments. Qualitative research methods for 
gathering data n a criminal justice environment nclude observing behaviors of small 
groups of people, focus groups, interviews and individual case studies. Qualitative 
research focuses on human life experiences in a social context. This method of research 
emphasizes understanding the meaning attached to events (Creswell, 2014, p. 13).
Qualitative researchers collect data themselves through examining documents, 
observing behavior, or interviewing participants. They may use a protocol—an 
instrument for collecting data—but the researchers are the ones who actually gather the 
information. They do not tend to use or rely on questionnaires or instruments developed 
by other researchers. This strategic plan s the result of a literature review of multiple 
gang violence reduction initiatives. East Palo Alto Operation Ceasefire, a 10-year study 
conducted by the Office of Justice merged with the National Gang Center (1995-2005), 
also a national youth gang survey conducted most recently by the OJJDP in 2012. 
Furthermore, the national nitiatives and surveys polled in this thesis and National Gang 
Center have similar components. Its key components reflect the best features of existing
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and evaluated programs across the country. The model outlines five strategies 
community mobilization, social intervention, opportunities for educational and vocational 
advancements, suppression, and organizational change and development. As most gang 
members join between the ages of 12 and 15, prevention is a critical strategy within a 
comprehensive response to gangs that includes intervention, suppression and reentry.
The youth gang initiative would be implemented in Lowndes County after the 
Board of Supervisors and County Department heads would convene on a meeting. The 
meeting consisted of County agencies and department leaders reporting on their efforts to 
reduce gang violence through prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry services. 
The next component is contracting a group of social policy research associates to prepare 
a strategic plan that improves alignment of Lowndes County’s gang violence prevention 
efforts leading to a greater impact going forward. This plan builds on the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) 
(Vinz et al., 2013, pp. 1-20).
Stakeholders in Lowndes County and across the nation have gained experience 
and know-how on models and methods designed to address this phenomenon. A 
significant body of evidence points to what works and what does not. Another advantage 
this plan has is the opportunity to partner with Valdosta State University as East Palo 
Alto Tennis and Tutoring took advantage of accessibility in to Stanford University. This 
experience offers beneficial effect of attracting technical assistance and some initial 
funding.
A similar effect can be seen in Monterrey County, California, in the city of Salina. 
Salina is one of 10 cities chosen to have participate in the California Cities Gang
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Prevention Network and National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention—a White House 
initiative. This experience offers beneficial effect of attracting technical assistance and 
some initial funding. It has also introduced local professionals to top experts in the field 
(Vinz et al., 2013, p. 9). The research and interviews done in Monterrey County revealed 
a positive vision. “County Departments and other agencies working on violence reduction 
revealed a common vision: creating a healthy, vibrant place for youth to grow strong, 
parents to be supported, and elders to share wisdom—a safe, sound place to live with 
economic opportunity for everyone” (Vinz et al., 2013, p. 10). This strategic plan is the 
product of extensive interviews and literature review. It provides top-level strategies for 
comprehensive, holistic approach to reducing violence and provides for an organizational 
structure for implementation.
East Palo Alto Tennis and Tutoring (EPATT) has positively impacted the children 
of East Palo Alto. Many students in EPA do not focus as much on education as shown 
through the 35 percent graduation rate. Rather than go to college, many become involved 
in gangs. This program encourages students from kindergarten to 12th grade to learn and 
focus on their education. I was able to call my former employer and head of the EPATT 
program and ask about the success the program is continuing to have. “EPATT requires 
parent participation or any standing advocate for a child,” said Dave Higaki, the 
executive director of EPATT. They expect a parent, grandparent or older sibling to 
support their education. EPATT has approximately 160 tutors, Stanford undergraduates, 
who work one-on-one with students to help with any academic concerns. They also give 
study tips, and help them prepare for test. This ensures that all kids will learn the needed 
subjects. Many have used EPATT for 3 to 4 years, and they have been able to go to
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college. EPATT does not necessarily deter children from joining gangs or not 
participating in school, but they make sure education is focused “EPATT makes 
education relevant,” Higaki said.
Here in Lowndes County we can offer better education not by going to the middle 
and high schools but nstead bringing the youth to us on Valdosta State campus. By 
holding the program here on campus I believe it offers two opportunities unavailable in 
any other setting. First, the opportunity for the participants to experience a university 
setting and providing a goal in which to aim to achieve, even if they do not come from 
families who have shared the same fate. Second, it provides the opportunities for college 
students to gain valuable experience in giving back and tutoring the underprivileged 
youth. In EPATT, we used tennis to build skills, persistence, and opportunity to help low- 
income youth beat the odds, however, I truly believe this should be spread across all 
athletics at Valdosta and a partner venture with academia.
Policy Implementation
This plan is a product of multiple interviews with county department heads, 
representatives of key agencies operating in gang violence reduction, and national experts 
in the field of gang reduction. Also using an extensive literature review of frameworks 
and best practices in violence prevention (G.R.E.A.T.), OJJDP NYGS (1995-2005,
2012), national review of Operation Ceasefire, and an overview of three regions of 
Georgia’s youth gang problems. Lowndes County must show a willingness to engage on 
the issue of gang prevention and collaborate across departments n order for this policy to 
be successful. The ability to engage on this gang issue collaboratively across departments
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provides a strong basis for the systematic changes needed to achieve essential objectives, 
and promises to sustain the partnerships and collaborations necessary for success.
Monterey County, California had a spike in homicides during 2009 that were 
determined to almost entirely be gang-related. In 2010, Monterey County led the state of 
California in youth homicide rates for the second year in a row making it a perfect 
candidate to propose a new gang violence policy. “At 24 per 100,000, for victims 
between the ages of 10 and 24 years, the County’s homicide rate is nearly three times that 
of the state of California and almost 50 percent higher than Alameda County, which 
ranks just behind Monterey County in the number of youth homicides” (Vinz et al., 2013, 
p. 6). Gang violence is concentrated in three ‘hot spots’ in Monterey County: (1) Salinas, 
which has suffered a a chronically high homicide rate; (2) South County, where gang 
violence spiked in 2012 to highest per capita homicide rate in the County; and (3)
Seaside, Sand City, and Marina. According to Seaside Chief of Police Vicki Myers, 
violent crime has risen between 300 percent to 350 percent over the last year (Vinz et al.,
2013, p. 7).
According to an article in the Valdosta Daily Times (Sept. 7, 2014). The South 
Georgia Gang Task Force has identified more than a dozen active gangs and hundreds of 
gang members in the Valdosta/Lowndes County area and are working to educate the 
community about their existence and to persuade potential recruits not to join.
The South Georgia Task Force monitors and responds to gang activity n the Southern 
Judicial District, which includes Brooks County, home to an estimated 300-gang 
members and has become a microcosm of the larger war of many youth gangs. Local and 
nationally affiliated groups have operations in Lowndes. The MS-13 gang, a nationally
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affiliated group, has developed a presence mostly outside Valdosta city limits in Lowndes 
County. The Hammerskins, a national white power organization, has as well. “We don’t 
see them too much, but when we do see the Hammerskins it is when we are dealing with 
a narcotics violation,” said the specialist. “We do have some form of Crips and some 
Bloods. Some represent the west coast, and represent the east coast. We do have gang 
members with Folk Nation and Gangster Disciples, and we do have some hybrid groups,” 
said the specialist (Floyd, 2014, p. 1).
The hybrid groups are mostly homegrown and are not affiliated with a national 
group, though they may associate with them. As Valdosta has grown, so continues to 
grow its youth gang problem. Even though whatever exists of a gang culture in Valdosta 
has largely been imported, it has been established long enough to ensnare local recruits. 
“They have some that are second generation now. Their brother or sister was in it, or their 
parents were in it, and t goes from there,” said the specialist. “Some live in 
neighborhoods where gang activity s prevalent, and that’s what young people see. The 
gang members are the ones stepping out with wads of money. They are the ones who 
have the women. They’re the ones who dress cool. They’re the ones that nobody messes 
with. So, these are the ones the kids try to identify with” (Floyd, 2014, p. 2).
These gangs often take the name of their neighborhood or street, according to the 
specialist. The Center for American Progress’ recent yearlong study, The Economic 
Benefits o f Reducing Violent Crime, estimated “the cost of violent crime in eight 
American cities n terms of direct and indirect costs to government agencies and 
individuals at nearly $17.6 billion” (Shapiro & Hassett, 2012, p. 20).
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For this proposal Lowndes County would need approximately $1 million per year 
in gang-violence related costs to be imposed on government agencies and community 
residents. Currently, public safety in the 2015 Lowndes County Annual budget was $17.5 
million of the total expenses. The Lowndes County Sheriffs Office is a member of a 
multi agency gang and violent crime task force operated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and comprised of investigators from the Lowndes County Sheriffs Office, 
the Valdosta Police Department, the Colquitt County Sheriffs Office, and the 
Thomasville Police Department.
The unit targets criminal enterprises focused on violent crimes and related 
activities as associated to both local and regional organized and semi-organized gangs, as 
the threats faced by our community have increased with the dramatic rise in such 
offenses. The goal of the unit is to both deter and/or prosecute offenders involved in gang 
activities, to educate the community as to the threats posed by these offenders, and to 
assist other divisions of the Lowndes County Sheriffs Office and associated law 
enforcement agencies in addressing crime related ssues. However, more coordinated and 
effective prevention, intervention, suppression, and reentry strategies can have a direct 
positive long-term financial impact, both in cost-savings and potential revenue. The true 
benefit of this proposal is t strives to increase strategically the impact of every dollar 
already invested, rather than merely investing more of government funding (Floyd,
2014). This proposal would be in direct partnership with this multi-agency gang and 
violent crime task force.
A 4-year plan will be implemented to phase out the 15-year-old D.A.R.E program 
that has been implemented by the Lowndes County Board of Education. After 2019 it is
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hoped that all agencies involved in the gang task force will have partnership in this new 
initiative to promote education and prevent youth delinquency. Currently, in Lowndes 
a four person D.A.R.E. team go into the elementary schools of Lowndes County and 
teach students for a 12 week block of instruction per school; ending with a culmination 
ceremony. D.A.R.E. is also taught with a 2-week program in the middle schools and high 
school as well. Members of the D.A.R.E. team in addition to being certified law 
enforcement officers receive additional yearly training in facilitating in a classroom 
setting and effective teaching methods and updates as mandated by D.A.R.E.
America. When not in a classroom teaching, each D.A.R.E. officer remains in the 
school. Given that many of out schools populations are getting very large, schools are 
communities of their own. D.A.R.E. officers protect those communities. Many of these 
attributes of the D.A.R.E. program can be administered in the partnership with Valdosta 
State University.
The same officers being trained for D.A.R.E. currently in Lowndes County could 
be trained and facilitated in the same means through this new initiative. Education would 
be relied on heavily but not limited to a two-week program in middle and high schools as 
it is now. One glaring issue that must be met in this new program would be an application 
for federal funding. D.A.R.E. is often classified under the Lowndes County Budget for 
drug resistance programs, therefore, D.A.R.E. receives the majority of its funding locally 
from Lowndes Drug Action Council, Inc. (LODAC). LODAC s a non-profit 
organization funded primarily by Lowndes County and the City of Valdosta. LODAC has 
received additional funding from High Risk Youth Grants, the Georgia Bar Foundation,
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and the Governor’s Discretionary Fund. LODAC also accepts contributions (About 
LODAC, n.d ).
In the first year, the program will be a summer only project until a full-time 
academic director could be hired. After the phasing out of D.A.R.E. it would be easier to 
access some of the LODAC funding needed to provide necessary school supplies and 
other materials for the underprivileged youth to use in the curriculum. Moreover, during 
the 4-year phasing out it will require the current officers to change their training from 
D.A.R.E. to the new program that would be facilitated through Valdosta State University. 
This training initially would be free since the program s being created here in Lowndes 
County. The major cost would accumulate after the phasing out of D.A.R.E. in order to 
launch a 5-year study to measure the effectiveness of the program and cooperation of 
acting agencies involved.
Gang violence though a relatively new phenomenon in Lowndes, is already 
beginning to exact heavy economic and social costs. Stakeholders in Lowndes County 
and across the nation have gained experience and know-how on models and methods 
designed to address this phenomenon. A significant body of evidence points to what 
works and what does not. Using the five steps proposed earlier in the Comprehensive 
Gang Model developed by the OJJDP are already in place or are proposed for 
implementation in this plan.
An initiative will only be successful if it is well managed from its design phase 
through its implementation. Due to the complexity of the gang violence issue and the fact 
that different county departments maintain different kinds of resources and assets that can 
help address the problem, this police department will create a position to oversee the
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design and then implementation. This new position will be called the gang violence 
prevention coordinator. To ensure access to key departments the coordinator will need to 
have their own office, furthermore, to ensure accountability the coordinator should report 
to the county administrator. The organizational structure required to carry out the action 
plan must follow the functional requirements of the plan. This is the job of the 
coordinator to convene, manage, and support an interdepartmental planning and 
implementation process, sustain the effort, and manage its progress over time. The 
implementation needs to be measurable against an agreed upon set of outcomes. The 
workgroup (district attorney, sheriff, probation, public defender, economic workforce) 
must receive regular updates about the progress toward these outcomes and their 
responsibilities clearly defined.
The approach on implementing the plan is based on the Collective Impact Model 
for Social Change. Collective impact is particularly suited to nitiatives that require 
coordination and collaboration among many different stakeholders who are looking to 
impact a shared goal, though they may have different and complementary individual 
missions: collective impact requires all participants to have a shared vision for change, 
one that includes a common understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving 
it through agreed upon actions. Take a close look at any group of funders and nonprofits 
that believe they are working on the same social issue, and you quickly find that it is 
often not the same issue at all. Each organization often has a slightly different definition 
of the problem and the ultimate goal. These differences are easily ignored when 
organizations work independently on isolated initiatives, yet these differences splinter the 
efforts and undermine the impact of the field as a whole. Collective impact requires that
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these differences be discussed and resolved. Every participant need not agree with every 
other participant on all dimensions of the problem. In fact, disagreements continue to 
divide participants in all of our examples of collective impact. All participants must 
agree, however, on the primary goals for the collective impact initiative as a whole 
(Kania & Kramer, 2011, p. 1).
Though this approach is typically used across different organizations in a 
community, it applies equally within a large organization, such as a county government. 
Even in Lowndes County, collective action on a top priority cause requires a driven 
department or a dedicated leader.
• This approach requires that the following five conditions are met:
• Common agenda- common agenda that groups have a shared vision for 
change. That means they also have a shared understanding of the problem 
and its solutions.
• Shared measurement- shared measurement requires groups to define 
common data points that are consistently collected and continually 
monitored for outcomes.
• Mutually reinforcing- Mutually reinforcing activities are groups that have 
different activities that reinforce and compliment each other around the 
common agenda, and are coordinated around an action plan
• Continuous communication is communication between partners and the 
coordinator is consistent and open, building trust and cohesion between 
groups.
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• Backbone organization is the final requirement, it requires a dedicated 
staff with the right skill set to coordinate and monitor the activities of the 
group around the action plan. Neutral means the backbone staff work for 
the shared agenda only, not to move forward an individual agenda (Kania 
& Kramer, 2011, p. 20).
Launching an interdepartmental initiative such as this is complex and multi-faceted. The 
challenge comes defining the success of the program and tracking Lowndes-Counties 
progress towards that success. An independent third-party evaluator should be brought in 
to track the initiative.
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Chapter VI 
CONCLUSION
Findings
The idea that gangs are a temporary phenomenon of deviant youth that criminal 
justice policies can bring to an end is nothing more than an mpossible fantasy. The gangs 
of the early 20th century, were localized and sporadic and while many gangs are still like 
this, many others are not. Street gangs are often deeply embedded in their communities 
and societies. They have been around for generations, have multiple generation members, 
and are rooted in local underground economies (even some legal economic activity). If it 
is unlikely that gangs are going to disappear, how should societies minimize their 
negative impact? One radical approach may be to cut the ground beneath the gang 
economy by decriminalizing the use of drugs. The government of Mexico, arguably the 
country most plagued by drug violence, has come to this conclusion and has 
decriminalized the possession of small quantities of drugs. The War on Drugs is notable 
because of its almost absolute failure (i.e. Third Strikes Legislation). It has put hundreds 
of thousands of people into the U.S. prison system. The U.S. prison system is being filled 
beyond capacity due to the influx of prisoners being penalized for drug related offenses. 
The U.S. spends billions every year trying to stop the trade n illegal drugs and tens of 
thousands of people employed in this effort. Yet with all these measures hardly a dent has 
been made in the demand and consumption of illegal drugs. Drug addiction is a public 
health problem and should be treated as such
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through regulation, counseling, treatment, and education. It is almost arbitrary to decide 
some drugs, for example marijuana, are illegal and others like alcohol and tobacco are 
not. In conditions of illegality levels of drug use have not dropped significantly, whereas 
in conditions of legality the use of nicotine has (Longmire, 2011).
Alcohol prohibition led to the development of the gangster economy that featured 
widespread corruption and drive-by shootings. The War on Drugs has blown prohibition 
out of the water when it comes to the damage it has caused. The procuring, transport, and 
sale of such drugs is the fuel that keeps many gangs in business. It is a major source of 
violence as gangs fight over territorial markets and to ensure compliance in drug 
transactions. Without the drug trade, youth gangs and violence would be significantly 
reduced.
The frontline of defense against violent street gangs must of course be the police. 
But how this policing takes place is key to whether gangs flourish or are contained. Many 
police departments have formed gang units with a militaristic approach to the problem, 
including sweeps, mass incarceration, and crackdown on minor criminality. A more 
effective strategy would be for police to become more involved with the welfare of poor 
communities, helping with referrals to social service agencies, and using a less coercive 
approach with youth (D.A.R.E.). Most youth or street gangs are rooted in a particular 
geographic community that they can count on for support. This support is obtained in a 
number of ways—fear and violence, peacekeeping, giving to charity, or even advocating 
for rights. The relationship between a gang and a community depends on a number of 
factors—the strength of police or other official presence, poverty level, nature of local 
economy and rate of drug consumption.
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